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ARTICLE
PREVENTING SEXUAL HARASSMENT: THE
FEDERAL COURTS' WAKE-UP CALL FOR WOMEN"
Martha S. West'
INTRODUCTION
Sexual harassment remains a serious problem for
women at work.1 The first federal cases recognizing sexual
harassment as a violation of Title VII were decided in the mid-
1970s.2 Over the last twenty-five years, federal law prohibiting
sexual harassment in employment has continued to develop,
and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC")
receives increasing numbers of sexual harassment complaints.3
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1 Although sometimes women harass men and sometimes women harass
other women, in the great majority of workplace incidents, men harass women. See,
e.g., infra note 3. Therefore, this paper will use the female pronoun when referring to
plaintiffs and the male pronoun when referring to alleged harassers.
' Sexual harassment is regarded as one form of sex discrimination and is,
therefore, prohibited in employment by Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e (2000). See HERMA HILL KAY & MARTHA S. WEST, SEX-BASED DISCRIMINATION
756-57 (5th ed. 2002) for a summary of the early legal history of sexual harassment.
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") issued guidelines on
sexual harassment in 1980. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1980).
3 Charges of harassment based on sex filed with the EEOC doubled during
the 1990s. In fiscal year 1990, the EEOC received 2,217 charges claiming harassment
based on sex, representing 3.6% of 1990 charges. EEOC, Trends in Harassment
Charges Filed With the EEOC During the 1980s and 1990s, at http://www.eeoc.gov/-
stats/harassment.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2002). In fiscal year 1999, the EEOC
received 4,783 sexual harassment charges, 6.2% of all 1999 charges. Id. When federal
EEOC charges are combined with state sexual harassment charges, the totals increase
from 10,532 filed in 1992, to 15,836 filed in 2000. The number declined slightly to
15,475 in 2001. EEOC, Sexual Harassment Charges EEOC & FEPA's Combined: FY
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The United States Supreme Court decided a pair of cases in
1998 that sought to simplify the law of sexual harassment, but
which have had mixed results. In Burlington Industries, Inc. v.
Ellerthj and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton,5 the Court
relabeled and rearranged the two categories of sexual
harassment complaints.
Before 1998, the federal courts labeled as "quid pro quo"
cases those situations where a supervisor threatened an
employee with some sort of job loss if she did not submit to his
sexual demands.6 In Ellerth, the Court changed both the name
and scope of the quid pro quo category. What was previously
known as a "quid pro quo" case became a "tangible job
detriment" case, limited to those situations where the
victimized employee actually lost her job or some other tangible
job benefit.7 The Court separated from the new category those
cases where a supervisor merely threatened a job loss, but
never carried out the threat. This type of case was shifted by
the Court to the pre-existing "hostile environment" category.8
1992 - FY2001, at http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/harass.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2002).
Women are not the only victims of sexual harassment. Men are also
sexually harassed at work. According to the EEOC's 2001 data, men's claims account
for 13.7% of sexual harassment charges filed with the EEOC or state agencies. Id. In
1992, men filed 9.1% of federal and state sexual harassment charges. Id. See also Reed
Abelson, Men, Increasingly, Are the Ones Claiming Sex Harassment by Men, N.Y.
TIMES, June 10, 2001, at Al. Most of the men's charges complain about sexual
harassment by other men, not sexual harassment of men by women. Id. The EEOC
does not keep track of the gender of the alleged harasser, only the gender of the
complainant.
4 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
i 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
6 In its Guidelines on Sexual Harassment, the EEOC described two
scenarios that became known as "quid pro quo" cases: "(1) submission to such [sexual]
conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of an individual's
employment, [or] (2) submission to or rejection of such conduct by an individual is used
as the basis for employment decisions affecting such individual." 29 C.F.R. § 1604. 1 l(a)
(1980).
7 See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 768.
8 In Ellerth, the Court rejected the prior categories of "quid pro quo" and
"hostile environment" sexual harassment. Id. Although a trier of fact could find that
Kimberly Ellerth's supervisor, 'red Slowik, made numerous threats to retaliate against
Ellerth if she denied him sexual liberties, Slowik never carried out his threats. Id. at
769. The existence of these threats in the fact pattern, however, caused the courts
below to classify the case as a "quid pro quo" case, leading to the possibility of holding
the employer strictly liable for the supervisor's actions. The Supreme Court, with
Justice Kennedy writing the majority opinion, rejected the "quid pro quo" label and
commented that this historical category was "of limited utility." Id. at 751. Instead, the
trier of fact should focus on whether the employee suffered a "tangible job detriment"
as a result of the sexual harassment:
When a plaintiff proves that a tangible employment action resulted from a
refusal to submit to a supervisor's sexual demands, he or she establishes that
[Vol. 68: 2
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The Court previously defined a hostile environment case as one
in which the sexual harassment by a supervisor or co-worker
was severe and pervasive and affected the victim's ability to do
her job.9
In Ellerth and Faragher, the Court set different
employer liability standards for the two kinds of cases. In a
tangible detriment case, the employer is now directly liable for
the employee's loss of a job or job benefit caused by a
supervisor's harassment, because the supervisor was clearly
acting as the employer or on behalf of the employer. 10 In a
hostile environment case, however, the employer liability rules
are more complicated. If a co-worker's sexual harassment
creates the hostile environment, the employer will be liable
only if the plaintiff proves that the employer was negligent-
that the employer knew, or should have known, about the
sexual harassment and failed to take immediate and
appropriate corrective action to prevent or stop the
harassment.1 If a supervisor created the hostile environment,
however, the plaintiff no longer has the burden to prove the
employer's negligence. Instead, the employer will be liable
the employment decision itself constitutes a change in the terms and
conditions of employment that is actionable under Title VII. . . .Because
Ellerth's claim involves only unfulfilled threats, it should be categorized as a
hostile work environment claim which requires a showing of severe or
pervasive conduct.
Id. at 753-54.
9 In Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986), the Court
defined a legally actionable hostile environment as one in which the sexual harassment
was "sufficiently severe or pervasive 'to alter the conditions of [the victim's]
employment and create an abusive working environment.'" Id. at 67. In Harris v.
Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993), the Court added to its definition by requiring
that the sexually harassing conduct be "severe or pervasive enough to create an
objectively hostile or abusive work environment-an environment that a reasonable
person would find hostile or abusive." Id. at 21. In addition, the victim herself must
"subjectively perceive the environment to be abusive," otherwise the conduct would not
have "actually altered the conditions of the victim's employment." Id. at 21-22.
10 To have a claim classified as a "tangible employment action," a plaintiff
must show "economic injury," or denial of a raise or a promotion:
A tangible employment action constitutes a significant change in employment
status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with
significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant
change in benefits.
Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 761. When the employee suffers such "direct economic harm," the
employer is liable. Id. at 762. "[A] tangible employment action taken by the supervisor
becomes for Title VII purposes the act of the employer." Id. In the absence of a tangible
action, however, the plaintiff only has a "hostile environment" sexual harassment case,
and the employer may or may not be liable for the supervisor's behavior.
" See EEOC's Sexual Harassment Guidelines, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(d) (1999).
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unless the employer proves the new affirmative defense created
by the Court in Ellerth and Faragher."
Under this new affirmative defense for a supervisor-
created hostile environment, an employer will not be liable if
the employer can prove two elements:
(1) that the employer "exercised reasonable care" to
prevent or promptly correct any sexually harassing
behavior; and
(2) that the complaining employee "unreasonably" failed
to take advantage of any sexual harassment policy,
or failed "to avoid harm otherwise." 3
When the Court announced this new affirmative defense
in 1998, attorneys for both employees and employers welcomed
the new structure for sexual harassment cases. Both sides
hoped that the affirmative defense would cause employers to
work harder to prevent sexual harassment from occurring and
that this would lead to decreased litigation. 4
12 One study found that most of the reported sexual harassment cases
involved harassment by supervisors, not co-workers. See Ann Juliano & Stewart J.
Schwab, The Sweep of Sexual Harassment Cases, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 548 (2001). In
analyzing over 650 cases decided between 1986 and 1995, plaintiffs named supervisors
as the sole harassers in 59% of the cases, and both supervisors and co-workers in 20%
of the cases. Id. at 564. The bulk of the cases involved hostile environment claims.
Almost 70% of the cases claimed hostile environment only, while an additional 22.5%
combined a hostile environment claim with a quid pro quo claim. Id. at 565.
" Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765. The employer has the burden to prove both
elements by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. The Court indicated that proof of
promulgation of an anti-harassment policy with a complaint procedure would normally
meet the employer's burden on the first element. Similarly, a plaintiffs "unreasonable
failure to use any [promulgated] complaint procedure" would "normally suffice" to meet
the second element. Id. The Court remanded the case for further litigation under its
new structure of a hostile environment claim.
In the companion case of Faragher v. Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998), the
Court found the city government employer liable for a hostile environment resulting
from supervisors' sexual harassment, because the city employer could not meet the
elements of the newly-created affirmative defense. Although the city adopted a sexual
harassment prevention policy six years before the plaintiff filed suit, it never
distributed the policy to the supervisors who harassed Faragher. Both the plaintiff and
her supervisors were unaware of the policy. Id. at 782. In finding that the city failed to
meet the first element of the affirmative defense, the Court noted that not only had the
city "failed to disseminate its policy against sexual harassment," but "its officials made
no attempt to keep track of the conduct of [the] supervisors" involved in the case. Id. at
808. With no complaint procedure in place, Faragher had no way to avoid the harm she
suffered. Consequently, the Court reinstated the trial court's judgment against the city.
Id. at 810.
14 See David G. Savage, Changing Rules on the Job, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1998, at
42.
Although created for sexual harassment hostile environment cases, federal
courts are applying this new affirmative defense in all types of hostile environment
cases, including cases of racial harassment. See, for example, the Seventh Circuit's
remarks in Hill v. American General Finance, Inc., 218 F.3d 639, 646 (7th Cir. 2000).
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It may be too soon to evaluate the impact of this new
affirmative defense on the actual prevention of sexual
harassment. Most of the federal court cases decided since 1998
involve fact patterns that arose before the Supreme Court's
Ellerth and Faragher decisions. Enough opinions have been
issued under the new structure, however, to raise serious
questions about the viability of the affirmative defense in
actually preventing hostile environment sexual harassment.
A disturbing trend is developing among the federal
courts. They are interpreting "reasonable care" in the first
prong of the new affirmative defense to require only minimal
prevention efforts by the employer. For example, some courts
have held that the mere promulgation of a policy, without any
effective enforcement mechanism, is enough to meet the
employer's burden of reasonable care under prong one of the
affirmative defense." At the same time, federal courts require
the victims, under the second prong, to produce hard-to-find
evidence of specific facts justifying any failure on their part to
complain to employers. Although the burden of persuasion
technically remains on the employer to prove both elements of
the defense, in reality, victims of sexual harassment now carry
a heavy production burden to justify a failure to file an internal
complaint. By creating this new affirmative defense for
employers, the Supreme Court is, in effect, telling women that
they must be willing to come forward and complain to
employers about sexual harassment before filing suit.
Otherwise, they risk losing their right to obtain any legal
redress under federal law.
Most troubling, federal courts are applying the
affirmative defense without any examination of women's
reluctance to complain because of fear of reprisal. Courts are
dismissing women's complaints under prong two of the
affirmative defense without examining the facts underlying
women's hesitation to file an internal complaint prior to suing
in federal court. To encourage women to overcome their fears,
instead of allowing employers to escape liability with minimal
See also Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 122 S.Ct. 2061, 2074 n.10 (2002).
As the EEOC has pointed out, harassment is "the only type of
discrimination carried out by a supervisor for which the employer can avoid liability."
See EEOC, Guidance on Vicarious Employer Liability For Unlawful Harassment by
Supervisors, 8 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) § 405, 7,651, 7,660 (1999) [hereinafter 1999
Guidance]. Consequently, the EEOC has advised employers and the courts that the
affirmative defense should be narrowly construed. Id.
15 See discussion infra accompanying notes 72-76.
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prevention policies, the federal courts should interpret the
affirmative defense to require employers to demonstrate that
their internal complaint procedures are effective.
Effective harassment prevention policies mandated by
Ellerth and Faragher would materialize if courts required
employers to provide employees with information on the
resolution of prior incidents of sexual harassment. Such
information would communicate to women that their employer
takes sexual harassment seriously, and that they should not
fear filing an internal complaint.
This Article calls on federal courts to apply the
affirmative defense in light of an overriding goal of Title VII: to
encourage employers to take effective steps toward preventing
sexual harassment in the workplace. The Article begins, in
Part I, with a discussion of sexual harassment in the broader
context of sex discrimination. It also explains why many
women are reluctant to file complaints of sexual harassment.
Part II surveys post-Ellerth/Faragher cases and analyzes the
federal courts' application of the new affirmative defense.
Addressing the tendency for federal courts to relieve employers
from liability under this defense, Part III offers a proposal to
increase the effectiveness of sexual harassment prevention
policies. Ultimately, the Article concludes that Title VII
plaintiffs, and eventually the courts, must require employers to
demonstrate the effectiveness of their prevention policies.
I. PUTTING SEXUAL HARASSMENT CLAIMS IN CONTEXT
Sexual harassment is simply one type of workplace
misconduct, but it has assumed a life of its own in employment
law. The obvious explanation for this is that it involves
allegations of sexual activity. Under the theory of Title VII,
sexual harassment is a specific form of discrimination against
women, or men, based on their biological sex or gender.
Because women, but not men, were traditionally the object of
sexually loaded comments and propositions at work, some
federal courts agreed with the early sexual harassment
plaintiffs that such harassment was a form of sex
discrimination under Title VII.' 6 The EEOC first defined sexual
See Tomkins v. Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044 (3rd Cir. 1977);
Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654 (D. D.C. 1976), rev. on other grounds. sub nom.
Williams v. Bell, 587 F.2d 1240 (D. C. Cir. 1978), remanded to Williams v. Civiletti, 487
F. Supp. 1387 (D. D.C. 1980); Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
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harassment in 1980 as "unwelcome sexual advances, requests
for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a
sexual nature."7 Under this legal definition, women had viable
sex discrimination claims if the harassment they experienced
contained a sexual component. The federal courts had earlier
recognized that harassment of employees based on their race or
ethnicity violated Title VII.1 Similarly, any harassment of
women because they were women would violate Title VII. In its
sex discrimination guidelines, however, the EEOC only set
forth specific guidelines for harassment containing sexual
content.
The use of the word "sex" in defining both sex
discrimination and sexual harassment causes serious difficulty
and confusion for both lawyers and the public because of its
dual meaning in the English language. Women can be harassed
because they are women, without the harassment containing
any sexual content. For example, if a supervisor or co-worker
makes comments on a regular basis that women are not
capable of doing a good job, such comments would be
considered harassment because of one's sex-what I call
gender-based harassment-but would not fall into the subset of
cases called sexual harassment. It would, however, violate Title
VII as one form of sex discrimination.
Many courts fail to distinguish between the more
general harassment of women because they are women and the
17 EEOC Sexual Harassment Guidelines, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1980). The
requirement that the sexual comments or actions be "unwelcome" has been
controversial over the years. In some situations at work, however, sexual comments
may be "welcome." One study estimates that approximately one-third of romantic
relationships between men and women begin at work. See Danielle Stanfield, A Defense
of Office Romance, 'Playing with Fire without Getting Burned', CHRON. HIGHER EDUC.,
Aug. 13, 1999, at A12 (discussing Professor Dennis Powers's study published in his
book THE OFFICE RoMANCE (1999)). Consequently, many sexual or flirtatious
interactions at work are, in fact, welcome.
Employers worry about sorting out the "welcome" sexual interactions at
work from the "unwelcome" ones, but this difficulty is highly overrated. Unwelcome
sexual comments become sexual harassment in a legal sense only when they become so
"severe and pervasive" that they interfere with an employee's job performance. To meet
this legal definition of a hostile environment, a situation involving sexual harassment
must go a long way beyond the hypothetical line separating "welcome" from
"unwelcome" sexual interactions by the time it is severe enough to provide the basis for
a legal claim.
18 See Firefighters Inst. for Racial Equal. v. St. Louis, 549 F.2d 506 (8th Cir.
1977); Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971). See also EEOC Guidelines on
National Origin Discrimination, 29 C.F.R. § 1606.8 (1980). In Meritor Savings Bank,
FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986), the Supreme Court, in its first sexual harassment
case, relied on the earlier racial and ethnic harassment cases to find that sexual
harassment violated Title VII.
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more specific type we now call sexual harassment. For
example, in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.," the company
president harassed Harris because she was a woman, telling
her in front of others, "[ylou're a woman, what do you know,"
calling her a "dumb ass woman," and saying "[wie need a man
as the rental manager. " " The company president's other
comments were sexual: he told Harris that she should go to the
Holiday Inn with him to negotiate her raise, and asked her if
she made a deal with a customer by "promising the guy ...
some [sex] on Saturday night.""' The Supreme Court treated
the case as a sexual harassment case, never distinguishing
between the elements of harassment that were sexual and the
elements that simply indicated a prejudiced view of women.2
The Supreme Court later commented in Oncale v. Sundowner
Offshore Services, Inc.,23 that "harassing conduct need not be
motivated by sexual desire to support an inference of
discrimination on the basis of sex." 4 The Court did not say
whether it would label such harassment as gender-based
harassment or sexual harassment, but it clearly recognized
that all forms of severe and pervasive harassment of either
women or men, based on their gender, violate Title VII.25
Despite the Court's condemnation of all forms of gender-
based harassment in Harris and Oncale, some federal courts
'9 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
20 Id. at 19.
21 Id.
22 Justice Scalia, writing for a unanimous Court, stated: "When the
workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is
sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and
create an abusive working environment, Title VII is violated." Id. at 21 (citations and
internal quotation marks omitted).
23 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
" Id. at 80. The Court continued: "A trier of fact might reasonably find such
discrimination, for example, if a female victim is harassed in such sex-specific and
derogatory terms by another woman as to make it clear that the harasser is motivated
by general hostility to the presence of women in the workplace." Id.
25 Id. at 80-81. Oncale involved only harassment of a sexual nature, fitting
squarely within the sexual harassment subset. In Oncale, the Court held that sexual
harassment of a man by other men would violate Title VII if the man could show that
he was the target of the harassment because he was a man. The Court remanded the
case to give the plaintiff the chance to make such a showing, but the case settled before
any further proceedings were held. In a subsequent case, a man did state a claim for
sexual harassment directed at him by other men because he did not meet traditional
male stereotypes. See Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256 F.3d 864 (9th Cir. 2001)
(holding that verbal sexual abuse directed at a man, because he acts too feminine, is
discrimination based on his gender and actionable under Title VII, relying on Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989)).
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have mistakenly denied gender-based harassment claims
because the harassment did not contain any sexual content.26
Other judges, and some commentators, however, take the view
that the term "sexual harassment" covers all forms of
harassment of women, both sexual and non-sexual.27 One
prominent scholar, Catharine MacKinnon, a pioneer in
developing sexual harassment law, explains: "Distinguishing
between sexist abuse that is sexual and sexist abuse that is not
sexual is a dubious and, in most if not all real situations, a
largely impossible venture. Almost all sexual harassment cases
contain both, litigated indistinguishably."21 Yet, some judges
continue to overlook gender-based harassment. Adding to the
confusion is the original EEOC definition of sexual harassment
as based on the presence of sexual content. Therefore, the law
retains greater clarity if we continue to distinguish between
the subset of sexual harassment and the broader concept of
gender-based harassment. Federal courts simply need to follow
the Supreme Court's lead and recognize that both types of
harassment violate Title VII. Gender-based harassment and
sexual harassment often appear together in fact patterns,
demonstrating that the wider scope of gender-based
harassment reinforces the abusive nature of sexual
harassment.29
A few courts have explicitly recognized the difference
between sexual harassment and the broader concept of gender-
based harassment, noting that both types violate Title VII. In
O'Rourke v. City of Providence,"° the First Circuit affirmed a
jury verdict in the plaintiffs favor and criticized the district
court for failing to appreciate that non-sexual gender
harassment violated Title VII just as much as sexual
harassment:
"' See Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE L.J.
1683, 1716-20 (1998); Cheryl L. Anderson, "Thinking Within the Box": How Proof
Models are Used to Limit the Scope of Sexual Harassment, 19 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP.
L.J. 125 (2001).
" See Catharine A. MacKinnon, The Logic of Experience: Reflections on the
Development of Sexual Harassment Law, 90 GEO. L.J. 813 (2002).
28 Id. at 828.
29 For further discussion of the distinction between sexual harassment and
other forms of sex discrimination, see David S. Schwartz, When is Sex Because of Sex?
The Causation Problem in Sexual Harassment Law, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1697, 1708-09
(2002); and Rebecca Hanner White, There's Nothing Special About Sex: The Supreme
Court Mainstreams Sexual Harassment, 7 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 725, 735-36 (1999).
30 235 F.3d 713 (1st Cir. 2001).
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[Slex-based harassment that is not overtly sexual is nonetheless
actionable under Title VII, so evidence of that sort may be
admissible. . . [Wihere a plaintiff endures harassing conduct,
although not explicitly sexual in nature, which undermines her
ability to succeed at her job, those acts should be considered along
with overtly sexually abusive conduct in assessing a hostile work
environment claim.... Courts should avoid disaggregating a hostile
work environment claim, dividing conduct into instances of sexually
oriented conduct and instances of unequal treatment, then
discounting the latter category of conduct. Such an approach defies
the Meritor Court's directive to consider the totality of circumstances
in each case and "rob[s] the incidents of their cumulative effect."...
Moreover, such an approach not only ignores the reality that
incidents of nonsexual conduct-such as workplace sabotage,
exclusion, denial of support, and humiliation--can in context
contribute to a hostile work environment, it also nullifies the
harassing nature of that conduct.
3 1
The facts of O'Rourke tell the lengthy story of abuse
encountered by one of the women, who, in 1992, unsuccessfully
tried to integrate the all-male fire department of Providence,
Rhode Island. This case perfectly illustrates the close link
between gender-based harassment of women, because they are
women, and sexual harassment of women."
As many commentators and theorists have explained,
sexual harassment of women at work is one form of abusive use
of power. 3' Rarely is sexual harassment rooted in an individual
man's interest in a voluntary, consensual sexual relationship
with a specific woman.34 It is primarily a way that men in a
mixed-gender workplace make women feel uncomfortable or
degraded, sending a clear message to women that men are still
31 Id. at 729-30.
3' The case details the direct connection between the firefighters' hostility to
the presence of any women in the workplace and their use of sexually-oriented
conversations, pranks and pornographic materials to force this woman out of her job.
Even Julie O'Rourke's two brothers and her brother-in-law, all Providence firefighters
as well, could not successfully intervene to protect her from the discriminatory actions
of firefighters, fire department officials and the city's Fire Chief. Id. at 718-23.
3 See Schultz, supra note 26, at 1756-1762; Katherine M. Franke, What's
Wrong with Sexual Harassment?, 49 STAN. L. REV. 691, 743, 762 (1997); Kathryn
Abrams, The New Jurisprudence of Sexual Harassment, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1169,
1205-13 (1998). David Schwartz offers a valuable critique of these underlying theories
in his article, When is Sex Because of Sex?, supra note 29, at 1748-58.
And even then, the sexual interest has often become an obsession on the
part of the man, who fails to accept the woman's lack of sexual interest in him. See
Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991), where the man's behavior became a
form of stalking. The major issue in that case was the employer's failure to take the
man's sexual obsession seriously enough and protect the woman from further stalking
in the work environment.
[Vol. 68: 2
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in control.3 Unfortunately, the federal courts' current
interpretation of the affirmative defense in hostile environment
cases ignores these power dynamics of the work environment.
Women are generally afraid to file workplace complaints
about sexual harassment, and relatively few do so."6 If there
were no other witnesses to the harassment women are
sometimes afraid no one will believe them. More often, they are
afraid of the consequences of complaining. 7  They are
35 See Michele Paludi et al., Sexual Harassment in Education and the
Workplace: A View from the Field of Psychology, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SEXUAL
VICTIMIZATION 132-33 (Michele Paludi ed., 1999). "Men who harass hold attitudes
toward women that are traditional, not egalitarian." Id. at 132. See also GWENDOLYN
MINK, HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT: THE POLICTICAL BETRAYAL OF SEXUALLY HARASSED
WOMEN 24, 27-28 (2000).
31 Sexual harassment is a seriously underreported problem at work. Some
workplace surveys have shown that between 42% and 44% of working women
experience behaviors regarded as legally actionable, but only 7% file formal charges
with their employers. Phoebe A. Morgan, Risking Relationships: Understanding the
Litigation Choices of Sexually Harassed Women, 33 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 67, 68 (1999). A
study at the National Institutes of Health in 1995 found that although 38% of women
employees experienced some form of unwanted or uninvited sexual attention, only 4%
took some type of formal action such as notifying their employer, 45% ignored the
incident or did nothing and 40% simply avoided the offender. Anne Lawton, The
Emperor's New Clothes: How the Academy Deals with Sexual Harassment, 11 YALE J.L.
& FEMINISM 75, 82, 87 (1999). See also Joanna L. Grossman, The First Bite is Free:
Employer Liability for Sexual Harassment, 61 U. PITT. L. REV. 671, 723-26 (2000). Some
women do not report harassment, not out of fear, but because they do not recognize the
behavior as harassment. See Theresa Beiner, Using Evidence of Women's Stories in
Sexual Harassment Cases, 24 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 117, 138 (2001). For
example, in the female-dominated occupation of nursing, harassment by doctors or
patients is so prevalent that women regard it as the norm, as just part of the job, not as
sexual harassment. Id. When women do realize they are being harassed, they generally
go into "avoidance mode," to avoid the entire situation, modifying their behavior at
work, changing where they go and what they do, to avoid confronting the harasser. Id.
at 139.
Sexually harassed women are not the only employees afraid to complain or
take action at work to confront management. One reason so many American employees
are reluctant to vote for union representation at work is the high level of fear of
retaliation and of losing their jobs if their employer became aware of any union
organizing activity. See PAUL WEILER, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE: THE FUTURE OF
LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW 114, 117 n.25 (1990) (stating that a 1984 Lou Harris poll
found 43% of nonunion employees thought their employer would fire or demote
employees who supported a union; a 1988 Gallup poll found that 69% of employees
agreed with the statement that employers harass, intimidate or fire employees who
speak out in favor of unions).
3' See Theresa M. Beiner, Sex, Science, and Social Knowledge: The
Implications of Social Science Research on Imputing Liability to Employers for Sexual
Harassment, 7 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 273, 314-15 (2001) [hereinafter Sex, Science
and Social Knowledge]. The 1994 study of sexual harassment in federal employment
conducted by the Merit Systems Protection Board found that women who did not report
sexual harassment to their employer had many reasons: 29% thought such a report
would make their work situation "unpleasant," 17% thought it would affect their
career, 19% thought the situation would not be kept confidential and 20% thought
nothing would be done. Id. at 315.
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particularly afraid if the harasser is their supervisor, but they
are also hesitant to complain about harassment by co-
workers." They are afraid other employees may shun them
because they complained. 9  Even though retaliation for
complaining is illegal,4° women most often are afraid they will
lose their jobs if they report harassment to their employer.4'
Federal courts overlook the well-documented reasons
why women often fail to complain about workplace harassment.
This oversight is significant because it causes federal courts to
use the employer's affirmative defense established in Ellerth
and Faragher to sharply limit women's ability to recover under
Title VII for workplace harassment. The following analysis of
cases applying the two prongs of the affirmative defense
demonstrates the need for courts to reinterpret the affirmative
defense and require stronger employer action to prevent sexual
harassment.
31 Underreporting is a serious problem even though much of the harassment
comes from co-workers, not supervisors. In surveys of federal employment done by the
Merit Systems Protection Board, among the women experiencing harassment, between
69% and 77% said they had been harassed by a co-worker; only 29% reported
harassment by a supervisor. Lawton, supra note 36, at 81 n.32. Although women report
high levels of harassment by co-workers, they appear more likely to sue when a
supervisor has harassed them. See supra note 12.
'9 This is what happened to Christina Matvia after her supervisor was fired
for sexually harassing her. See Matvia v. Bald Head Island Mgmt., Inc., 259 F.3d 261
(4th Cir. 2001), discussed infra, notes 106-112 and accompanying text.
40 See section 704(a) of Title VII, which prohibits retaliation against an
employee "opposing" discrimination or "participating" in proceedings under the statute.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1996).
41 In confidential surveys of employees at major U.S. corporations, more than
half of the employees who experienced harassment said that fear of reprisal kept them
from reporting the harassment. Lawton, supra note 36, at 128. In Montero v. AGCO
Corp., 192 F.3d 856, 859 (9th Cir. 1999), the plaintiffs fear of losing her job prevented
her from making any complaint about her supervisors for many months. Montero, is
discussed infra notes 329-37 and accompanying text.
Women's fears of retaliation for reporting sexual harassment appear to be
justified. Those who report harassment are more likely to quit a job, be fired from a job
or be transferred. Lawton, supra note 36, at 126. Employees who use internal
grievance procedures and file appeals within the company have significantly lower
rates of promotion, and higher rates of lay-off and termination. Id. at 127.
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II. APPLICATION OF THE EMPLOYER'S AFFIRMATIVE
DEFENSE
A. Prong One of the Affirmative Defense: What Must an
Employer Do to Demonstrate "Reasonable Care" to
Prevent Harassment?
In creating the affirmative defense in Faragher v. City
of Boca Raton,2 Justice Souter, on behalf of the majority,
explained that employers should not necessarily be liable for a
hostile environment created by a supervisor's sexual
harassment if the employer has "provided a proven, effective
mechanism for reporting and resolving complaints of sexual
harassment, available to the employee without undue risk or
expense." 3 Unfortunately, the federal courts have not followed
the Court's suggestion that employers demonstrate that they
have proven and effective policies to prevent and correct sexual
harassment. Instead, the courts are granting employers
summary judgment on the affirmative defense based upon
evidence of minimal policies with questionable effectiveness.
The Supreme Court and the EEOC have articulated
conflicting standards on what "reasonable care to prevent or
correct harassment" means. The Faragher Court held that
"reasonable care" required an employer to promulgate a policy
explaining what sexual harassment is and telling employees
whom to contact to complain if sexual harassment occurs. The
employer was also required to distribute the policy to
employees. In Faragher, the Court found that the employer had
not exercised "reasonable care" because, even though the city
had adopted a policy against sexual harassment several years
earlier, it never distributed this policy to the Marine Safety
Headquarters on the city beach where the harassing
supervisors and the plaintiff worked as lifeguards.4
Furthermore, the Court found the city would be unable to meet
the affirmative defense because the policy did not include any
assurance that an employee could bypass the harassing
supervisors and register a complaint with someone else.45
42 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
43 Id. at 806 (emphasis added).
Id. at 782. In support of its determination that the city did not show
.reasonable care" to prevent harassment, the Court also mentioned that the city had
made no attempt to keep track of the conduct of these supervisors, who were stationed
at a remote location. Id. at 808.
" Id. at 808.
20021
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
Consequently, since the Faragher decision, well-advised
employers distribute anti-harassment policies to employees
and include provisions making it clear that employees can
complain about harassment to someone other than their
supervisor.
In the companion case, Burlington Industries, Inc. v.
Ellerth,6 Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, outlined
the new affirmative defense but did not specifically discuss an
employer's duties as Justice Souter did in Faragher. Justice
Kennedy introduced the Court's affirmative defense by stating:
"Title VII is designed to encourage the creation of
antiharassment policies and effective grievance mechanisms.
Were employer liability to depend in part on an employer's
effort to create such procedures, it would effect Congress'
intention to promote conciliation rather than litigation . . .,,"
After setting forth the two prongs of the affirmative defense,
Justice Kennedy commented:
While proof that an employer had promulgated an antiharassment
policy with complaint procedure is not necessary in every instance as
a matter of law, the need for a stated policy suitable to the
employment circumstances may appropriately be addressed in any
case when litigating the first element of the defense.4
Several courts have picked up on Justice Kennedy's general
statement in Ellerth, and have ruled that actual promulgation
or distribution of a policy is not necessary for the employer to
prove the affirmative defense.49
In June 1999, the EEOC issued a policy statement on
employer liability for unlawful harassment by supervisors,
expanding on both Ellerth and Faragher.5' In addition to
recommending that every employer establish, publicize and
enforce adequate policies and complaint procedures, the EEOC
recommends training for all employees to ensure that they
understand their rights and responsibilities."' In the EEOC's
view, at a minimum an adequate policy should contain a clear
explanation of the prohibited conduct, assure employees that
they will be protected from retaliation if they file a complaint
46 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
41 Id. at 764 (emphasis added).
48 Id. at 765 (emphasis added).
49 See discussion infra, notes 57-71 and accompanying text.
50 1999 Guidance, supra note 14, § 405, at 7,651-68.
51 Id. at 7,661.
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and set forth an accessible complaint procedure that provides
for a prompt, thorough and impartial investigation, resulting in
appropriate corrective action if harassment is found.52 The
EEOC's guidance memorandum assists employers by giving
examples of questions to ask during an investigation and
makes helpful suggestions for assessing the various
participants' credibility when employees give conflicting
accounts of events. 3
The EEOC cautions employers, however, that there are
no "safe harbors" based solely on written policies and
procedures: "Even the best policy and complaint procedure will
not alone satisfy the burden of proving reasonable care if, in
the particular circumstances of a claim, the employer failed to
implement its process effectively."54  For example, if
management ignored previous complaints by other employees
about the same harasser, then the employer has not shown
reasonable care in preventing subsequent harassment. 5 The
EEOC acknowledges, however, that its instructions are not
mandatory, and the lack of a formal policy may not defeat the
affirmative defense if the employer, particularly smaller
employers, can point to other facts demonstrating an exercise
of reasonable care through other means.56
The federal courts have not followed the EEOC's advice
on the degree of prevention necessary for an employer to
demonstrate reasonable care. Instead, federal courts are
advancing Justice Kennedy's suggestion that reasonable care
can be shown even in the absence of a detailed policy
distributed to employees. At least one federal circuit court
ruled that an employer satisfies the "reasonable care"
requirement by simply having general policies in a notebook
available to employees. In Hill v. American General Finance,
Inc. , plaintiff Louise Hill, the only African-American in the
employer's Alton, Illinois one-room office, sued for severe racial
5' Id. at 7,661-62.
Id. at 7,665-66.
' Id. at 7,660-61.
"' 1999 Guidance, supra note 14, § 405, at 7,661. See, e.g., Dees v. Johnson
Controls, World Servs., Inc., 168 F.3d 417 (11th Cir.1999) (stating that complaints of
sexual harassment had been filed in 1991, but no corrections were made before
plaintiffs complaint in 1994).
1999 Guidance, supra note 14, § 405, at 7,660-61. "Small employers may be
able to effectively prevent and correct harassment through informal means, while
larger employers may have to institute more formal mechanisms." Id. at 7,660.
7 218 F.3d 639 (7th Cir. 2000).
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and sexual harassment by her supervisor.58 The employer kept
its policies addressing "Equal Employment Opportunity" and
"Sexual Harassment in the Workplace," plus a non-specific
complaint procedure, in a set of notebooks in a "public access
type place."59 Although Hill testified that she did not receive
copies of these policies, she said she knew there was a human
resource group within the company to which she could
complain about racial or sexual harassment.6 °
Hill's supervisor began harassing her in September
1994 during her first month on the job as a loan agent. On
February 2, 1995, she sent an anonymous letter to the
company's CEO pretending to be a customer and complaining
about the supervisor's offensive and vulgar comments to
customers. On February 6, she wrote another letter and signed
it "a very worried and frighten[ed] employee."61 When the
company investigated these complaints, she did not tell them
she authored the letters. Finally, in April 1995, she wrote a
letter to the director of operations, specifying the many racist,
vulgar, offensive remarks and touchings by her supervisor that
she had endured since her first month on the job.62 Three weeks
later, her supervisor was transferred to a different office, given
a warning and penalized by a $10,000 reduction in pay. At the
same time, the company transferred Hill to an office in St.
Louis, across the river from Alton, in order "to prevent
retaliation from her co-workers."63 She objected to the transfer,
claiming that the office was in a high crime area, and quit in
July 1995. The federal district court ruled against Hill and
granted the company's motion for summary judgment before
the 1998 decisions in Ellerth and Faragher.64
Although the district court granted summary judgment
under pre-existing law, two members of the Seventh Circuit
panel evaluated the lower court's decision under the Supreme
Court's new structure for sexual harassment cases. The panel
affirmed the district court's decision in light of the employer's
affirmative defense created in Ellerth and Faragher. In regard
to the first prong of the affirmative defense, the panel found
58 Id. at 641.
" Id. at 643-44.
'0 Id. at 644.
01 Id. at 641.
Hill, 218 F.3d at 642.
63 Id.
4 Id. at 641.
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that while the employer's promulgation of its policies against
racial or sexual harassment might "leave room for
improvement, the policies get the job done."65 More importantly,
the court found that the employer took "reasonable care to
prevent and correct promptly" the harassment because it
transferred the supervisor as quickly as it could after receiving
Hill's written complaint: "by Hill's own account, she and [her
supervisor] were in the Alton office together for only 5 or 6
days" after Hill's notification.66 The majority simply looked at
what actions the employer took once it found out about the
harassment, saw that it "promptly corrected" the situation, and
did not seriously evaluate whether the employer had any
mechanisms in place to prevent the harassment from
occurring.
Judge Diane Wood dissented from the panel's opinion in
Hill. Noting that the case arose before Ellerth and Faragher
were decided, she found the record insufficient to support the
new affirmative defense.67 She concluded that the employer's
policies were inadequate under prong one. The "Equal
Opportunity" and "Sexual Harassment" policies only stated
that the employer would comply with the law: "This policy
accomplishes nothing, unless we are giving employers credit for
stating the obvious and for giving a telephone number for
further inquiries."68 Judge Wood found the policies particularly
unsatisfactory in light of the trend, both before and after the
Supreme Court's 1998 decisions, of employers adopting much
more careful antiharassment policies:
Those policies take care . . . to underscore the fact that even
supervisory employees must treat everyone with respect, to set forth
alternate ways to voice complaints (in case one route is effectively
blocked because the harassing supervisor would get in the way), and
to stress the importance of preventive measures. Careful policies
describe the disciplinary measures the company might use in a
harassment case, encourage employees to make complaints, state
unequivocally that retaliation will not be tolerated, and explain that
69
complaints will be examined in a confidential manner.
According to Judge Wood, the employer was even more
vulnerable under prong one of the affirmative defense because
65 Id. at 643.
id.
67 Hill, 218 F.3d at 646.
68 Id.
69 Id.
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Hill never received copies of these policies, nor was there
evidence that the company distributed the policies to
employees. Inadequate policies, "buried in some notebooks," did
not show reasonable care to prevent harassment: "Employees
cannot be expected to go around opening up all sorts of
unmarked binders, to see if by any chance they might contain
the company's harassment policy."0 Judge Wood would have
reversed the summary judgment under prong one of the new
affirmative defense.7'
Other circuits similarly require only minimal efforts on
the employer's part to satisfy prong one of the affirmative
defense. In Barrett v. Applied Radiant Energy Corp. ,72 the
Fourth Circuit indicated that under the "law of the circuit," the
mere distribution of a sexual harassment prevention policy to
employees is "compelling proof' that the company exercised
reasonable care in preventing and promptly correcting
harassment. 3 The policy in Barrett was vague, telling potential
70 Id. at 647.
71 Id. On the other hand, both the majority and the dissent rejected Hill's
retaliation claim, finding that Hill's transfer to St. Louis was not an "adverse
employment action" and, therefore, she suffered no retaliation. Id. at 645, 647. In the
Seventh Circuit's view, an "adverse employment action" necessary for a retaliation
claim under § 704 of Title VII occurs "when an employee is fired or demoted, suffers a
decrease in benefits or pay, or is given a significantly lesser job." Id. at 645. In their
minds, not every bad thing that happens at work can be considered sufficiently adverse
to trigger the protection of the statute: "Not every unwelcome employment action
qualifies as an adverse action. Negative reviews, a change in job title, an increased
distance to travel to work, or a lateral transfer do not, by themselves, qualify." Id,
Other circuits do not take such a narrow view of the retaliation protections of Title VII.
See Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234 (9th Cir. 2000); Torres v. Pisano, 116 F.3d 625,
639-40 (2d Cir. 1997).
72 240 F.3d 262 (4th Cir. 2001). For analysis of the Fourth Circuit's holdings
under prong two of the affirmative defense, see infra notes 94-112 and accompanying
text.
73 Id. at 266. The cases cited by the Barrett court for the "law of the circuit"
do not actually support its holding. In one of them, Lissau v. Southern Food Service,
Inc., 159 F.3d 177 (4th Cir. 1998), the Fourth Circuit remanded the case for further
proceedings because Ellerth and Faragher had been decided while the case was
pending on appeal. In reversing summary judgment for the employer, the appellate
court "express[ed] no view" on the proper disposition of a renewed summary judgment
motion based on the new affirmative defense. Id. at 182. In commenting on the possible
use of the defense, however, the court stated: "evidence that Southern had
disseminated an effective anti-harassment policy provides compelling proof of its efforts
to prevent workplace harassment" (citing Faragher and Ellerth). Id. (emphasis added).
No determination was made because no facts had been presented on this issue during
the lower court proceedings.
In the second case, Brown v. Perry, 184 F.3d 388 (4th Cir. 1999), the
Fourth Circuit commented that under Ellerth's holding, an employer may be able to
prove the first prong without any policy in place, or, on the other hand, "mere
promulgation of such a policy may well fail to satisfy the employer's burden" of proving
reasonable care. Id. at 396. It all depends on the facts of the case. In Brown, the Fourth
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complainants that if they did not feel they could discuss the
matter with their supervisor, "you should contact any member
of the management team, male or female, with whom you feel
comfortable discussing the situation."74 The Fourth Circuit
found that this general statement provided "clear direction" to
employees.75 In addition, the court commended the policy
because it included a statement that an employee's complaint
would be kept "as confidential as possible" and included an
anti-retaliation provision."
As time goes by, however, mere distribution of a policy
may not be enough to meet the requirement of "reasonable
care." In Harrison v. Eddy Potash, Inc.," the employer
promulgated a policy in 1989, distributed it to its supervisors,
asked them to read it to their crews and post it on employee
bulletin boards.78 After its initial implementation in 1989, the
policy was ignored. When plaintiff Harrison began work for the
company in 1992, she did not receive a copy of the policy, and it
was not posted on the bulletin board in the changing room used
by the women miners. The supervisor, who sexually assaulted
Harrison on at least five occasions in May and June of 1993,
admitted at trial that he heard no mention of the sexual
harassment policy after 1989, and that the company never held
seminars on sexual harassment." Accordingly, the Tenth
Circuit affirmed the jury verdict against the company under
the first prong of the affirmative defense, finding that the
Circuit found not only that the employer, the U.S. Department of Defense, had an
effective anti-harassment policy in place, but that the actions the employer took after
plaintiffs two reports of sexual harassment demonstrated reasonable care. See id. The
resolution of the case, however, did not rest on prong one of the affirmative defense,
but on prong two. The Fourth Circuit ruled against the plaintiff because she "failed to
avoid harm otherwise." Id. at 397. The plaintiff was sexually assaulted in a hotel room
at a conference by a regional director from a distant location; she complained about the
assault but told her supervisor she only wanted the harasser to apologize to her. Id. at
390-91. Six months later she encountered the harasser again at another conference,
went out drinking alone with him and went back with him to his hotel room at
midnight. Id. at 391. Again, he grabbed her, kissing and groping her. Id. The plaintiff
complained a second time and the employer disciplined the harasser. Id. at 392. By her
voluntary actions, the Fourth Circuit held that the plaintiff "utterly" and
'unreasonably" failed to avoid harm. Id. at 397.
14 Barrett, 240 F.3d at 265.
"' Id. at 266.
76 Id.
77 248 F.3d 1014 (10th Cir. 2001).
78 Id. at 1027.
79 Id. at 1027-28.
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company had not exercised reasonable care in preventing
sexual harassment.80
A few courts have reversed or denied summary
judgments for employers because questions of fact remained on
prong one of the affirmative defense, necessitating a trial on
the merits. In Frederick v. Sprint/United Management Co.,
81
the employer issued several policies over a four-year period,
with different directions on where employees should file
harassment complaints.82 The plaintiff had actually complained
to two different supervisors about her supervisor's harassment,
but they took no responsibility for forwarding her complaint to
the proper company office. A year later, the person responsible
for enforcing the anti-harassment policy learned about the
harassment, investigated the situation and terminated the
harassing supervisor." The Eleventh Circuit found that, under
these facts, significant questions remained about whether the
employer exercised reasonable care in preventing further
harassment."4 A key factor in the court's decision was the
alleged one-year delay between the plaintiffs first attempts to
notify her employer and the employer's eventual response.
In Simon v. City of Naperville," the plaintiff was a new
police officer being trained by a ranking officer, who
immediately began harassing her. The district court denied
summary judgment for the employing police department,
finding that questions of fact remained regarding the
employer's exercise of reasonable care in preventing further
harassment from occurring. 6 Even though the city suspended
the harassing supervisor for ten days after the police
department investigated the harassment, the plaintiff had
heard rumors of retaliation, that other officers would not back
her up when she was on duty, and the department made it
clear she might be assigned to work with the harasser in the
future.87
80 Id. at 1028.
246 F.3d 1305 (11th Cir. 2001).
82 Id. at 1314-15.
Id. at 1310.
8 Id. at 1315.
85 88 F. Supp. 2d 872 (N.D. Ill. 2000).
86 Id. at 877.
87 Id. See also Robles v. Cox & Co., 154 F. Supp. 2d 795 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)
(finding employer's "open door" policy, encouraging employees to complain to
management, with no specific reference to sexual harassment, is not adequate to meet
the standard of reasonable care).
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The few decisions denying or reversing summary
judgment for employers under prong one of the affirmative
defense stand in stark contrast to the many decisions in the
employer's favor. Despite language in Ellerth and Faragher
about the need for employers to have effective prevention
policies, federal courts have demonstrated little concern since
1998 for employers' efforts to prevent harassment. Instead of
focusing on prevention-an employer's policies and actions
taken before harassment occurs-the courts focus only on what
an employer does after it learns of the harassment. Indeed, a
recent study analyzed seventy-two hostile environment sexual
harassment cases where employers moved for summary
judgment based on the affirmative defense." The study found
that the judicial opinions were largely result-oriented, and
employers won summary judgment in over 50% of the cases.89
More importantly, the study shows that judges primarily
focused on the employer's response to the sexual harassment
allegations, shielding employers from liability if the judge
believed the employer did as good a job as it could once it found
out about the alleged harassment. °
David Sherwyn et al., Don't Train Your Employees and Cancel your "1-800"
Harassment Hotline: An Emprical Examination and Correction of the Flaws in the
Affirmative Defense to Sexual Harassment Charges, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1265, 1268-
69, 1280 (2001). The authors studied all reported cases granting or denying summary
judgment motions between June 1998 and January 2000.
9 Id.
90 Id. at 1285-86, 1294. "Where employers assert an affirmative defense and
seek a favorable summary judgment, courts appear to allow employers either to make
or break their own cases." Id. at 1285.
As the authors point out, in both Ellerth and Faragher, the plaintiffs never
complained to the employer about the harassment; they simply filed with the EEOC
and sued in federal court. Consequently, the Supreme Court designed the affirmative
defense to deal with cases where women never complained before suing. Id. at 1302.
Therefore, the employers never took any action to deal with the harassment. So, no
questions were raised about whether the employers' actions in those cases were prompt
and appropriate in stopping the harassment. In the cases since 1998, the courts are
basically collapsing the two-pronged affirmative defense into one basic question--did
the employer act appropriately once it learned of the harassment?
One perceptive scholar has pointed out that the federal courts should not
be using the affirmative defense at all in situations where the employer has learned
about the harassment, whether from the victim or from other employees. See B. Glenn
George, If You're Not Part of the Solution, You're Part of the Problem: Employer
Liability For Sexual Harassment, 13 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 133 (2001). When the
employer learns about the supervisor's harassment, the employer should be directly
liable for any harm that occurs resulting from the employer's negligence in responding
to the harassment. Id. at 142. The affirmative defense should be used only in those
cases where the harassment is unknown to the employer, and where the employer
would only be vicariously liable for any harm to the plaintiff. The author acknowledges,
however, that the federal courts are applying the affirmative defense to all supervisor
hostile environment cases, regardless of whether the employer knows or does not know
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Contrary to observers' expectations of the impact of
Ellerth and Faragher, the authors of the study conclude that
the existence of the affirmative defense in hostile environment
cases changed the law very little from what it was before 1998.
Courts are holding that the mere creation and dissemination of
a policy is sufficient to meet an employer's duty of reasonable
care.9" If the reasonable care requirement of prong one remains
relatively easy for an employer to prove, what about prong two?
B. Prong Two of the Affirmative Defense: What Reasons
Justify a Woman's Failure to Complain?
Through prong two of the affirmative defense, the
Supreme Court imposed on women who suffer sexual
harassment at work what amounts to a new "exhaustion"
requirement. If an employer has a sexual harassment
prevention policy, the target of harassment must now file a
timely claim under that policy. Otherwise, her employer will
likely escape liability in a subsequent lawsuit. Unless women
become aware of this new requirement, many will lose their
right to legal relief.92 In theory, the second prong gives a
woman the chance to produce evidence that her fear of
complaining was reasonable. In reality, however, under current
federal court interpretations, women are losing their sexual
harassment cases when they fail to complain to the employer
before filing suit, or if they delay too long in telling the
about the harassment. Id. at 143, 145.
91 Sherwyn et al., supra note 88, at 1289-90. The statistical analysis of these
seventy-two cases showed that more than 90% of employers had adopted a workplace
harassment policy, but less than 70% had disseminated it to employees. Id. at 1280.
Only 40% offered employees an alternative channel apart from their supervisor to
report harassment. Id.
Commentators optimistically predicted that after Ellerth and Farragher
employers would not prevail in summary judgment motions, that mere promulgation of
a sexual harassment policy would not meet the standard of reasonable care and that
plaintiffs who did not report harassment to the employer would survive summary
judgment. Id. at 1268. See Estelle D. Franklin, Maneuvering Through the Labyrinth:
The Employers' Paradox in Responding to Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment-A
Proposed Way Out, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1517, 1548-58, 1588-89 (1999).
92 See Catherine Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, Civil Rights Without Remedies:
Vicarious Liability Under Title WI, Section 1983, and Title IX, 7 WM. & MARY BILL
RTS. J. 755 (1999).
The average sexual harassment victim probably is not going to read Ellerth
and Faragher, so she will never know that, if she wants to file a lawsuit later,
she had better register a complaint with her employer first. By the time she
consults a lawyer, she probably no longer will be working for the employer,
and it will be too late.
Id. at 787.
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employer about the harassment.93 The federal courts are giving
inadequate consideration to the reasons why many women fail
to complain about sexual harassment in the workplace.
1. Vague and Subjective Fears Do Not Justify a Failure
to Complain
It has been very difficult for women to justify to federal
judges any failure to report sexual harassment to their
employers. The federal courts have repeatedly held that vague
and subjective fears of retaliation, including fear of losing her
job, are not sufficient to make a woman's failure to complain
reasonable. In Barrett v. Applied Radiant Energy Corp.,"
plaintiff Barrett testified that she did not report her
supervisor's harassment to any of the managers because she
feared retaliation and doubted that her complaint would be
taken seriously.95  Barrett testified that her harassing
supervisor was a good friend of the company's president,
leading her to conclude that the company would not take
measures against him. The Fourth Circuit, affirming a district
court judgment overturning a jury verdict in the plaintiffs
favor, ruled that a "generalized fear of retaliation" is not a
93 Sherwyn, Heise and Eigen found that among the seventy-two cases they
analyzed, 42% of the plaintiffs did not report the harassment to their employers before
filing suit. Sherwyn et al., supra note 88, at 1280. In all of these cases, if the employer
was able to prove prong one of the defense, the employer was also able to prove prong
two. The authors concluded: "failure to report is tantamount to per se 'unreasonable'
behavior in the federal courts' opinions." Id. at 1290. See also John Marks, Smoke,
Mirrors, and the Disappearance of 'Vicarious' Liability: the Emergence of a Dubious
Summary-Judgment Safe Harbor for Employers Whose Supervisory Personnel Commit
Hostile Environment Workplace Harassment, 38 HOuS. L. REV. 1401 (2002). Professor
Marks finds a third prong in the EllerthiFaragher affirmative defense: "[11f the plaintiff
unreasonably failed to avoid harm, is the employer entitled to complete liability
avoidance or just reduced damages? . . .would the reasonable [plaintiffl have [been
able to] avoidO all harm or just some [of the] harm?" Id. at 1421. He criticizes the
federal courts for completely dismissing plaintiff cases on summary judgment without
evaluating what portion of the harm the plaintiff could have avoided and what portion
was unavoidable. Under EllerthiFaragher, and tort principles of "avoidable
consequences," employers should remain-vicariously liable for any unavoidable harm to
plaintiff. Id. at 1420-23, 1431-32, 1436-37.
240 F.3d 262 (4th Cir. 2001). For a discussion of the Fourth Circuit's first
prong analysis in Barrett, see supra notes 72-76 and accompanying text.
95 Barrett, 240 F.3d at 267. Barrett was severely harassed by her supervisor
from June to November 1997. She first complained to the EEOC in October 1997. Once
the company learned of the harassment in November of 1997, it investigated and then
fired her supervisor within a week's time. Id. at 265. All of these events occurred prior
to the Supreme Court's creation of the affirmative defense. Consequently, neither
Barrett nor her attorney would have known that she had an obligation to complain to
the company before she filed a charge with the EEOC.
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reasonable basis for a plaintiffs failure to complain to
management.96 After pointing out that Title VII protects
plaintiffs from retaliation for reporting harassment, the Fourth
Circuit noted that Barrett presented no evidence that her
employer had ever taken any adverse action against employees
who had previously complained."
In addition, the court would not accept her argument
that reporting sexual harassment would be futile because
members of the company's management happened to be
friends.98 In the court's view, this would place an impermissible
burden on small businesses, many of which are organized
around existing friendships.99 Addressing Barrett's plight, the
court stated:
We acknowledge that discussing such matters as sexual harassment
with company managers often puts the harassed employee in an
awkward and uncomfortable situation. Nevertheless, this "inevitable
unpleasantness" cannot excuse an employee from taking advantage
of her employer's complaint procedure.'00
Barrett also argued that she failed to complain to
management because she believed senior managers themselves
had engaged in sexual harassment and had never been
disciplined for it; therefore, management would likely ignore
her complaints.' The company denied the allegations of prior
sexual harassment, but pointed out that, regardless of their
merit, these rumors related to events that occurred five years
before Barrett started working for the company and two years
before the company adopted its sexual harassment policy.102
The Fourth Circuit agreed that these allegations were
insufficient to relieve Barrett from her obligation to use the
company's policy.' °
Given the facts of her case, however, Barrett stood little
chance of convincing any court to take her fears seriously. As
soon as the company learned of the harassment from a third
party, it fired Barrett's harasser within a week.0 4 Because the
96 Id.
97 Id. at 268.
98Id.
9 Barrett, 240 F.3d at 268.
100 Id.
101 Id.
102 Id.
103 Id.
104 Barrett, 240 F.3d at 267.
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company acted so decisively and swiftly in investigating and
ending the harassment, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district
court's ruling that the employer met its burden under the
affirmative defense.'
The Fourth Circuit similarly affirmed a summary
judgment for the employer in Matvia v. Bald Head Island
Management, Inc., 10 dismissing all of plaintiff Matvia's reasons
for failing to complain as inadequate. °7 The court seemed
particularly impatient with Matvia's fears of retaliation from
co-workers, even though those fears turned out to be accurate.
Matvia's evidence detailed the ostracism and hostile comments
from her co-workers that continued for two months after the
company terminated her harassing supervisor, until Matvia
eventually quit.' ° The court acknowledged that "[n]ot only is it
embarrassing to discuss such matters with company officials,
but after the harassed employee overcomes this hurdle she may
have to deal with a negative reaction from co-workers."' °
Nevertheless, the Fourth Circuit held that an employee's duty
to report harassment under Title VII "is so essential . . ., that
we 'have refused to recognize a nebulous fear of retaliation as a
basis for remaining silent."""1 If a woman harassed at work
worries about retaliation for complaining, then the court
concluded that she should simply bring a subsequent
retaliation claim if her fears are realized: "The bringing of a
retaliation claim [under Title VII], rather than failing to report
sexual harassment, is the proper method for dealing with
retaliatory acts.""' The Fourth Circuit's suggestion is cold
comfort for both plaintiffs and their attorneys who understand
the difficulty of winning any type of Title VII claim in federal
court.
Again, however, the Fourth Circuit's failure to take
Matvia's fears seriously can be explained by the employer's
swift action in terminating the harassing supervisor as soon as
it learned of the harassment. The harasser himself told the
105 Barrett is a good example of how the two prongs of the affirmative defense
have been collapsed into a single issue. The court was primarily concerned with the
question of whether the employer took prompt and appropriate corrective action as
soon as it learned of the harassment.
'0' 259 F.3d 261 (4th Cir. 2001).
107 Id. at 270.
108 Id. at 266.
100 Id. at 270.
110 Id. (quoting Barrett, 240 F.3d at 267).
111 Matvia, 259 F.3d at 270.
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employer about his unsuccessful attempts to kiss Matvia. He
was immediately suspended without pay for four days and then
terminated twelve days later."' Once an employer has taken
such decisive action against a harasser, a plaintiff will have a
very hard time bringing a successful Title VII sexual
harassment suit.
Similar to these Fourth Circuit cases, the plaintiff in
Leopold v. Baccarat, Inc.11 did not meet her burden of
producing evidence that her subjective fears of complaining
were based on anything other than her own belief."' The
Second Circuit defined a "credible fear" as a fear that is "based
on more than the employee's subjective belief. Evidence must
be produced to the effect that the employer has ignored or
resisted similar complaints or has taken adverse actions
against employees in response to such complaints.""' The court
emphasized that plaintiffs bear only the burden of production,
not the burden of persuasion, on the second prong of the
affirmative defense."6 It held, however, that plaintiff Leopold
failed to produce sufficient evidence:
Here, Leopold did not come forward with any such evidence, but
instead simply asserted her apprehension that she would be fired for
speaking up, and claimed generally that a co-worker's vague and
ambiguous complaint was not taken seriously. Such conclusory
assertions fail as a matter of law to constitute sufficient evidence to
establish that her fear was "credible"-that "her complaint would not
be taken seriously or that she would suffer some adverse
employment action."" v
Leopold alleged that her harassing supervisor made
sexist comments toward her and the other saleswomen, and
threatened to fire all of them and "replace them with 'young
and sexy' hires."".8 Evidently, in the Second Circuit's view,
"' Id. at 268.
113 239 F.3d 243 (2d Cir. 2001).
14 Id. at 246.
11 Id.
11 The Second Circuit explained:
Once an employer has satisfied its initial burden of demonstrating that an
employee has completely failed to avail herself of the complaint procedure,
the burden of production shifts to the employee to come forward with one or
more reasons why the employee did not make use of the procedures. The
employer may rely upon the absence or inadequacy of such a justification in
carrying its ultimate burden of persuasion.
Id. at 246.
117 Id.
118 Leopold, 239 F.3d at 244.
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threats to fire women because they are not young and sexually
attractive do not translate into threats to fire someone for
complaining about such harassment. Furthermore, the court
did not deem these earlier threats sufficient to create an issue
of material fact that would allow Leopold to survive summary
judgment.
One court went so far as to hold that an actual threat by
a harassing supervisor-a threat that he would terminate the
woman if she complained-was not enough to justify her
failure to complain. In Sconce v. Tandy Corp.,"' the federal
district judge explained his decision as follows:
Of course, when a supervisor threatens termination an employee
may reasonably fear retaliation. To be sure, harassing supervisors
often threaten termination in order to intimidate and manipulate
their victims. Effective complaint procedures are designed to protect
against precisely such retaliatory conduct. They are intended to
divest a harassing supervisor of any power he has over the
victimized employee. It follows that a threat of termination, without
more, is not enough to excuse an employee from following procedures
adopted for her protection. . . . Evidence that procedures are
administered fairly and that an employee is not required to report
the misconduct to her harasser demonstrates the unreasonableness
of the employee's conduct."2
In Sconce, the employer had a sexual harassment
prevention policy. The court simply assumed the policy was
effective because it was published in the employee handbook
and directed employees to submit complaints to one of three
offices, including the director of employee relations.' In a
footnote, the court indicated that plaintiffs remain free to
produce evidence of "particular circumstances" indicating that
they behaved reasonably in failing to complain.122 In this case,
however, Ms. Sconce produced no such evidence.2 3
Consequently, the court granted her employer's motion for
summary judgment.24
In a handful of cases, federal courts ruled against
employers on prong two of the affirmative defense when women
were able to produce evidence of a "reasonable" fear, based on
"objective" facts, justifying their failure to complain. In
"9 9 F. Supp. 2d 773, 778 (W.D. Ky. 1998).
120 Id.
121 Id.
122 Id. at 778 n.8.
123 Id.
14 Sconce, 9 F. Supp. 2d at 778 n.8.
20021
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
Johnson v. West,'25 the Seventh Circuit reversed a lower court's
bench trial judgment for the employer on the basis that the
employer had not proven prong two of the affirmative
defense. 126 Michelle Johnson was the secretary for Karl
Williams, chief of police at a Veterans Administration hospital.
Shortly after she began work for Williams, he began his
campaign of sexual harassment, including unwelcome sexual
intercourse, sexual touching and later, after Johnson began
dating another man, verbal abuse.'27 During her first year of
probationary employment, she did not report any of this
abuse. 2 ' Toward the end of that year, she told a co-worker
about the harassment, and this co-worker encouraged her to
report it to one of the employer's Equal Employment
Opportunity officers.
129
Eventually, a year-and-a-half after Johnson began
working for Williams, she reported the harassment to the
director of the hospital.2 ° Four months later, the hospital
transferred Johnson out of Williams's office. At the end of
another five months, the hospital removed Williams as chief of
police, and restored Johnson to her original job.' The trial
court ruled in favor of the hospital on the hostile environment
affirmative defense, finding that it had a sexual harassment
prevention policy in place, and investigated and responded
adequately to Johnson's complaint once she filed it, thereby
exercising "reasonable care" to prevent or correct sexual
harassment. 1
3 2
The Seventh Circuit reversed, however, because the
district court made no finding on whether Johnson's failure to
complain was reasonable. There was evidence at trial that
Williams had threatened and intimidated Johnson, convincing
her that because she was a probationary employee, she would
lose her job if she took any action against him.'33 Johnson also
presented evidence at trial that she was under severe
emotional and psychological stress as a result of the
126 218 F.3d 725 (7th Cir. 2000).
12 Id. at 727-28, 732.
127 Id. at 728.
128 Id.
129 Id.
130 Johnson, 218 F.3d at 728.
1"1 Id. at 729.
132 Id. at 731.
13 Id. at 732.
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harassment."T Her co-workers testified that she appeared
fearful and introverted while she was working for Williams."5
The Seventh Circuit held that these factual issues raised the
possibility that Johnson's failure to complain at an earlier point
in time was reasonable, which would defeat the VA's
affirmative defense to the hostile environment claim.'
Consequently, the case was remanded for further
proceedings.137
Testimony from co-workers in support of a plaintiffs
fears seems to be critical to survive summary judgment. In
another case, a federal district court denied an employer's
motion for summary judgment under prong two of the
affirmative defense, despite the plaintiffs failure to complain
in a timely way. The plaintiff testified that co-workers told her,
based on their own experiences, that the company's human
resources department would fail to act on any sexual
harassment complaint she filed and that she would be
subjected to retaliation. The plaintiff supported her
statement with an affidavit from a co-worker. In addition, the
record contained evidence that the harassing supervisor
expressly threatened the plaintiffs job when she rejected his
sexual advances.'39  The court held that, under these
circumstances, the plaintiffs fear of reporting the harassment
may have been "objectively" reasonable, and that the issue of
reasonableness under prong two was one for the jury to
decide.14°
In a third case, Frank v. Plaza Construction Corp.,1
plaintiff Frank was sexually harassed by the company's CEO.
Frank testified that she failed to report the CEO's conduct
because she felt there was no one in the company to whom she
could turn, and that "[she] would be fired if [she] reported his
134 id.
135 Johnson, 218 F.3d at 732.
136 Id.
137 Id.
"8 Maple v. Publ'ns Int'l, Ltd., No. 99-C-6936, 2000 WL 1029112, at *5 (N.D.
Ill., July 25, 2000).
139 Id.
"o Id. See also Anderson v. Deluxe Homes, Inc., 131 F. Supp. 2d 637, 651
(M.D. Pa. 2001). Plaintiff may have had a reasonable fear of retaliation that prevented
her from complaining; other employees had informed her that she would lose her job if
she complained. This is an issue for a jury and cannot be decided on summary
judgment.
1 186 F. Supp. 2d 420 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
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conduct."42 In addition, Frank alleged that she complained to
three managers at the company about other executives'
inappropriate sexual remarks, and they not only ignored her
complaints, but became more hostile to her." In response to
the employer's motion for summary judgment, the district court
suggested that the harasser's high-ranking status in the
company may be enough by itself to create a jury question on
whether plaintiffs fear of complaining was reasonable."" The
harasser's position of authority, combined with the lack of
support Frank received from the other managers when she
complained about other incidents of harassment, was sufficient
evidence for the court to deny the employer's summary
judgment motion on the affirmative defense."5
Despite these few cases where courts considered a
woman's failure to complain in a timely fashion justifiable, the
federal courts are generally giving short shift to plaintiffs'
claims. In analyzing all reported federal decisions on summary
judgment from 1998 to 2000, commentators Sherwyn, Heise
and Eigen found that women lost on summary judgment in
every case where they failed to report the harassment and the
employer had met the first prong of the affirmative defense. 4 '
A high percentage of the cases studied involved plaintiffs who
feared complaining to their employers, but the plaintiffs were
unable to convince the courts to take their fears of retaliation
seriously."'7 The authors concluded, as many courts have since
held, that plaintiffs will have to produce "objective" evidence,
not just "subjective" fears of reprisal, to justify a failure to
complain.'48  Otherwise, plaintiffs will lose on summary
judgment.
" Id. at 430.
1 Id. at 431.
'" Id. at 430.
141 Id. at 431.
146 Sherwyn et al., supra note 88, at 1286.
147 Employees failed to report the harassment to the employer in twenty-eight
(39%) of the seventy-two cases studied. Employers won on summary judgment in
twenty of those cases. In the remaining eight cases, the employer had not met the
requirements of prong one of the affirmative defense. Id.
148 Id. at 1291.
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2. Courts Mistakenly Deem a Request for
Confidentiality as a Failure to Complain
Under the holdings of recent cases, plaintiffs will also be
in danger of having their cases dismissed on summary
judgment if they complain, but request confidentiality. Federal
judges are likely to hold that "confidential" reports are the
same as no report at all. Some courts have equated a request
for confidentiality with an "unreasonable" failure to complain.
This is ironic because courts often mention the promise of
confidentiality in an employer's policy as a positive factor in
demonstrating the employer's reasonable care."'
Requests for, and promises of, confidentiality are
common in sexual harassment prevention practice, no doubt
due to the sexual nature of the workplace misconduct. Talking
about sexual activity in a professional or other type of
workplace environment is very difficult for most people,
because we regard sexual issues as intensely private.' When
the sexual harasser is one's supervisor, it becomes even more
difficult to complain given the inherent power imbalance.
Women often ask that their complaint be kept confidential out
of fear or embarrassment.' They somehow think that a
149 See Barrett v. Applied Radiant Energy Corp., 240 F.3d 262 (4th Cir. 2001);
Hill v. Am. Gen. Fin. Inc., 218 F.3d 639, 646 (7th Cir. 2000) (Wood, J., dissenting in
part).
A request for confidentiality should be distinguished from an anonymous
complaint. If an employer maintains an anonymous "hot line," women can call the hot
line and get advice about their situation without identifying themselves or where they
work in the organization. If the complaint is anonymous and the caller does not
identify the alleged harasser, the employer is under no obligation to respond to that
particular situation. If the caller identifies the harasser, however, the employer is on
notice of possible harassment and may be required to investigate or take some other
action.
Many plaintiffs complain in person; their complaints are not anonymous.
Yet, they are afraid and want to limit the consequences of coming forward. The
plaintiff requested confidentiality for this reason in Hooker v. Wentz, 77 F. Supp. 2d
753, 758 (S.D.W.Va. 1999). The plaintiffs request, and the employer's willingness to
honor her request, became an important factor in her failure to prove hostile
environment sexual harassment under the Supreme Court's new affirmative defense.
Id. at 758. See discussion infra notes 179-90 and accompanying text.
"0 See Sally Goldfarb, Violence Against Women and the Persistence of Privacy,
61 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 44 (2000). "Traditionally, anything to do with sexuality has been
seen as belonging to the private, domestic sphere because it concerns intimate,
personal relationships." Id. at 44. Establishing sexual harassment as a recognizable
employment discrimination claim was a groundbreaking event because it transferred
these issues of sexuality from the private sphere into the public sphere of the economic
marketplace. Id. at 44-45.
'51 See supra notes 36-41, and accompanying text.
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request for confidentiality will help protect them from
retaliation or further harassment.
In drafting sexual harassment prevention policies,
employers often promise confidentiality, in part, to encourage
women to come forward with complaints. In addition, both
complainants and employers rely on the strong tradition in
American employment of attaching confidential status to
personnel issues. 52 Furthermore, employers have every
incentive to keep sexual harassment complaints as confidential
as possible, to avoid "disruption" of the work force, the normal
distraction from work that occurs when serious or out-of-the-
ordinary events happen and employees find out about them.
Despite employers' interests in minimizing workplace
knowledge of sexual harassment incidents, complete
confidentiality has not been possible under the law since 1980.
In its initial 1980 Guidelines on sexual harassment, the EEOC
directed employers to take "immediate and appropriate
corrective action" to stop sexual harassment between
employees. 5 ' This means that employers are obligated to act as
152 This tradition, however, may be breaking down. Recent cases demonstrate
the difficulty and risks employers face when trying to impose confidentiality rules on
employees. In a wrongful discharge case, the California Court of Appeals held that an
employer violated public policy when it discharged a marketing director for discussing
bonus payments with other employees. In Grant-Burton v. Covenant Care, Inc., 122
Cal. Rptr. 2d 204 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002), the court cited a California statute prohibiting
discharge because an employee "discloses the amount of his or her wages." Id. at 213.
Other sources of public policy relied on by the court to find the discharge wrongful were
federal and state labor laws protecting employees from discrimination because of their
concerted activities in discussing terms and conditions of employment with each other.
Id. at 214-16.
In several sexual harassment cases, courts have criticized employers and
found retaliation when employers took adverse action against victims of harassment
after the victim violated the employer's request not to discuss the harassment with
anyone else. See Maple v. Publ'ns Int'l, Ltd., No. 99-C-6936, 2000 WL 1029112, at *9
(N.D. Ill., July 25, 2000). See also Ferris v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 277 F.3d 128, 133, 136
(2d Cir. 2001) (finding employer negligence in failing to prevent the rape of flight
attendant by another flight attendant; the finding was predicated, in part, on
management's warning to an earlier rape victim not to tell any other flight attendants
about her rape by the same male employee).
13 See EEOC Sexual Harassment Guidelines, 11 C.F.R. § 1604.11(d) (1980).
This Guideline was written as an affirmative defense for employers to avoid liability
for sexual harassment between co-workers:
With respect to conduct between fellow employees, an employer is responsible
for acts of sexual harassment in the workplace where the employer (or its
agents or supervisory employees) knows or should have known of the conduct,
unless it can show that it took immediate and appropriate corrective action.
Id.
This language requiring "immediate and appropriate corrective action" was
repeated in subsection (e) covering possible employer liability for acts of non-employee
third parties, such as customers or clients.
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soon as they learn about the harassment.'54 If employers must
do something, obviously employees are going to notice
whatever action is taken. The Supreme Court's new affirmative
defense reinforces the 1980 EEOC Guidelines by putting the
burden of persuasion on the employer to prove that it has
"exercised reasonable care to... correct promptly any sexually
harassing behavior" of which it has notice.
155
This creates a difficult dilemma for employers. One
court acknowledged this "catch-22 situation," noting that the
employer would be risking a finding of liability if it honored a
complainant's request for confidentiality: "If an alleged victim
of sexual harassment asks a person of authority ... to keep it
confidential, and the employer attempts to reduce the
emotional trauma on the victim by honoring her request, it
risks liability for not quickly and effectively remedying the
situation."56
Other courts, however, have not held employers to the
EEOC's announced standard for taking prompt and effective
action to end harassment, and some have even allowed a
plaintiffs request for confidentiality to eliminate the
employer's liability. In a case decided before the Supreme
Court created the new affirmative defense in 1998, the Second
Circuit upheld summary judgment for the employer, based
upon the woman's request for confidentiality, despite the fact
that the employer learned of the harassment from other
employees.
tr In Malik v. Carrier Corp., 202 F.3d 97 (2d Cir. 2000), as part of its ruling
against an employee's claim that he was improperly investigated for possible sexual
harassment, the Second Circuit stated:
[An employer's investigation of a sexual harassment complaint is not a
gratuitous or optional undertaking; under federal law, an employer's failure
to investigate may allow a jury to impose liability on the employer .... Nor is
the company's duty to investigate subordinated to the victim's desire to let
the matter drop. Prudent employers will compel harassing employees to cease
all such conduct and will not, even at the victim's request, tolerate
inappropriate conduct that may, if not halted immediately, create a hostile
environment.
Id. at 105-06. See further discussion of Malik infra, notes 305-326 and accompanying
text.
155 Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998). See also
HAROLD S. LEWIS & ELIZABETH J. NORMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW AND
PRACTICE 70-71 (2001).
15 Gallagher v. Delaney, 139 F.3d 338, 348 (2d Cir. 1998). In Gallagher, the
court of appeals reversed summary judgment for the employer, ruling that a factual
dispute over the plaintiffs alleged request for confidentiality and employer's failure to
talk to the alleged harasser about the plaintiffs complaint was a matter for the jury in
deciding liability.
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In Torres v. Pisano,"7 plaintiff Torres, a Puerto Rican
woman employed by New York University, suffered silently for
three years in a hostile environment created by her supervisor
Coe's derogatory ethnic and sexual remarks."' Torres's co-
workers told Mr. Pisano, a higher level supervisor, about the
harassment."5 9 Pisano called Torres into his office and
suggested that she file a written complaint. 6 ' Torres did
nothing. Three or four months later, Pisano asked her again to
file a written complaint.' One month later, Torres finally
wrote to Pisano, apologizing for not writing sooner: "It has
taken me quite a while to gather courage and strength to begin
this letter .... I have never felt so intimidated by anyone until
I started working for Mr. Eugene Coe.""62 After describing only
a few specific allegations, and a few general ones, she ended
the letter by requesting confidentiality: "Len, I hope and ask
you to please keep this confidential until we both speak about
this matter."6 ' She sent a second letter three days later with
more details, and then met with Pisano one or two weeks later,
again requesting him "to keep this confidential."'64 Three
months later, after further meetings with management, Torres
was transferred to another position while Coe was on
vacation.' The university eventually investigated the
situation, and terminated Coe one year after Torres's initial
meeting with Pisano.66
In Torres's subsequent lawsuit, the trial court granted
NYU's summary judgment motion, finding that it could not be
held liable for Coe's harassment of Torres. The Second Circuit
upheld the trial court's decision on the ground that NYU's and
Pisano's failure to act immediately upon learning of the
harassment was reasonable given Torres's request for
confidentiality.'67 Judge Calabresi described the issue as
follows:
157 116 F.3d 625 (2d Cir. 1997).
15 Id. at 628.
159 Id.
160 Id.
161 Id.
161 Torres, 116 F.3d at 628.
163 Id.
"' Id. at 629.
165 Id.
166 Id.
167 Torres, 116 F.3d at 638-39.
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We . . . have before us a situation in which an intimidated and
embarrassed employee was finally able to gather the strength to
complain about the harassment that she had been enduring, but
specifically asked the supervisor to whom she complained to keep
the matter confidential and to refrain from taking action until a
later date. Does a supervisor breach his duty to remedy the
harassment by honoring the employee's request? That is not a
question that we can answer categorically. Its resolution will vary
from case to case. 168
According to Judge Calabresi, in some circumstances,
the supervisor would be required to act, despite a
complainant's request for confidentiality, but not in this case.
69
Here, according to the judge, there were no allegations that
Torres suffered any physical or psychological harm.7 ° There
were no allegations that other employees were being subjected
to the same hostile environment.17" ' The Second Circuit
concluded that Pisano behaved reasonably in honoring Torres'
request for confidentiality. Therefore, even though Pisano did
nothing for months, NYU was not liable for the breach of any
duty to protect Torres from further harassment.
172
The Second Circuit issued its opinion in Torres one year
before Ellerth and Faragher, at a time when liability issues
were in great flux among the federal courts of appeal. 7 ' If the
Second Circuit decided Torres under the Supreme Court's new
affirmative defense, perhaps it would have reached a different
result.74 The first issue would have been whether or not the
168 Id. at 639.
169 id.
170 Id.
171 Id. The court failed to note that Tor-es was the only woman working for
Coe, making it most unlikely that any other employees working under Coe would have
complained. The other twenty-nine employees he supervised were all men, and
presumably, not of Puerto Rican ancestry. Id. at 628, 639. The court seemed oblivious
to this fact, and never took it into account in analyzing the impact of the harassment
on Torres. See, e.g., id. at 632-33.
172 Torres, 116 F.3d at 639.
... See the Court's discussion in Ellerth of the eight separate opinions
produced by the Seventh Circuit en banc in discussing the Ellerth situation on appeal.
Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 749-51 (1998). See also HERMA HILL KAY &
MARTHA S. WEST, SEX-BASED DISCRIMINATION 837-838 (4th ed. 1996).
174 One scholar argues that the EllerthIFaragher affirmative defense should
not apply at all to this type of case. See George, supra note 90. George divides
supervisor hostile environment cases into two kinds: (1) where the employer knew
about the harassment and, therefore, would be directly liable for the harassment; and
(2) where the harassment was unknown to the employer, and, therefore, the employer
would be vicariously liable for the harassment. The EllerthIFaragher affirmative
defense should be used only for the second category of cases. Id. at 142. As the author
acknowledges, however, the federal courts are erroneously applying the affirmative
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employer "exercised reasonable care" to end promptly the
sexually harassing behavior. In Ellerth and Faragher, the
Court emphasized the importance of an employer's
promulgation of a complaint procedure with guidance to
employees on filing complaints with someone other than their
own supervisor. 17' The purpose of the affirmative defense was
to encourage employees to complain, so that employers would
have notice of the harassment. In Torres, the employer received
notice from one of Torres's co-workers; the employer knew the
harassment was occurring before Pisano asked Torres to file a
written complaint.176 The Court's opinions in Ellerth and
Faragher created an inference that the employer must act as
soon as it learns that an employee is being harassed. The
employer cannot wait for a plaintiffs permission to correct the
problem if a manager already knows it is serious. Even before
1998, however, a better application of the legal obligation to
stop sexual harassment would have been for the Torres court to
recognize that NYU's duty to stop the harassment arose before
Torres requested confidentiality.
Under the post-1998 framework, the second issue in
Torres would be whether Torres's fear of her supervisor,
coupled with the lack of adequate protection from retaliation
for complaining, made her request for confidentiality
"reasonable" or "unreasonable." It is particularly disturbing
that the Second Circuit considered the fear and intimidation
experienced by Torres to be grounds for rejecting the liability of
her employer, who failed to act for over nine months.77 The
Second Circuit found that Torres did not suffer from
psychological harm, but the facts seem otherwise. Torres wrote
letters to Pisano describing how distressed she was and how
difficult it was to find the "courage" to complain.'78 When a
plaintiff like Torres is clearly intimidated and afraid, the
employer should be required to take stronger and more
effective steps to end the harassment immediately. In
situations like this, an employer should not be absolved of
responsibility. Torres's own fears, expressed in her request for
defense to both types of supervisor hostile environment cases. Id. at 143, 145.
"' Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 806,
808-09 (1998).
176 Torres, 116 F.3d at 628.
177 Although Pisano heard about the harassment from co-workers in the fall of
1993, NYU did not move the plaintiff away from the harasser until July of 1994. Id. at
629.
178 Id. at 628.
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confidentiality, should not have been a bar to the employer's
liability.
Since 1998, courts continue to rely on the Second
Circuit's holding in Torres, allowing employers to honor a
plaintiffs request for confidentiality, and then using a
confidentiality request to justify an employer's failure to take
prompt and effective measures to end the harassment. Other
courts penalize plaintiffs for requesting confidentiality by
viewing the request as a failure to complain.
In Hooker v. Wentz,179 plaintiff Hooker never filed a
written complaint about her supervisor's harassment under the
company's sexual harassment policy, which was contained in
its Policy Book and posted in all employee work and break
areas.8 0 According to the district court, Hooker's employer,
United Parcel Service ("UPS"), first learned about the
harassment when she filed her federal court complaint. 8'
Although Hooker never filed a formal internal company
complaint under the UPS policy, she did speak to part-time
supervisor Bryant about "certain comments" Wentz had made
to her.8 2 At the same time, Hooker asked Bryant "to keep their
conversations private." 3 The trial judge commented, "[she] did
not ask him to report it to higher authorities," implying that
this supervisor had no obligation to report Hooker's
information to the proper human resources office unless she
specifically requested this action. Citing Torres, the judge
concluded that "in maintaining Hooker's confidence, Bryant did
not breach his duty to remedy the harassment."' 4 Bryant was
unaware that Wentz was harassing any other employees, and
Hooker told Bryant only about some of Wentz's comments, not
about the physical sexual touching and explicit propositions.8 "
Therefore, the court concluded, "the law will not presume that
persons protected by Title VII cannot make reasonable
179 77 F. Supp. 2d 753 (S.D.W.Va. 1999).
1 0 Id. at 757.
l' Id. at 757, 758. Actually, the employer would have received notice of the
plaintiffs claim when she filed with the EEOC, a prerequisite for filing a federal court
complaint under Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (2000). Section 2000e-5(b) requires
the EEOC to notify the employer within ten days that plaintiff has filed a
discrimination charge with the agency.
182 Hooker, 77 F. Supp. 2d at 757.
183 Id.
1 4 Id. at 758.
185 Id.
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decisions for themselves about how best to proceed with their
harassment claims. "186
The court found that UPS "exercised reasonable care" by
promptly correcting any sexually harassing behavior, and that
the plaintiff "unreasonably failed to take advantage of' the
employer's corrective opportunities.'87 Hooker testified that she
did not ask Bryant to report the harassment because Wentz
"had a bad temper" and she was afraid of losing her job.188 The
court did not take her reasons for requesting confidentiality
seriously: "A plaintiffs subjective fears of confrontation or
retaliation do not, however, alleviate the duty to take
advantage of an effective anti-discrimination complaint
procedure provided by the employer .... Allowing Hooker to
circumvent the reasonable complaint requirements would
eviscerate the affirmative defense crafted by the Supreme
Court."'89 Again, the court ignored the fact that Hooker gave
notice to her employer of her harassment by Wentz when she
talked to supervisor Bryant. The court discounted this notice
because she requested that Bryant "keep it private." Thus, the
court used Hooker's request for confidentiality based on her
fear of retaliation as a reason to defeat her entire legal claim.
Notably, the court found no obligation on the part of Bryant to
do his own investigation and determine if any other employees
were being harassed.9 ' Significantly, the court decided Hooker
on summary judgment, where the constrained nature of the
proceedings make it very difficult for a federal judge to have
any sense of the level of fear a plaintiff might have in
requesting confidentiality.
Based on the results in Torres, Hooker and other cases
finding plaintiffs unreasonable for failing to complain, it is
clear that federal judges need substantial education about the
difficulty women face in reporting sexual harassment and why
they request confidentiality. Only if federal judges become
aware of the many studies documenting the high degree of
underreporting, and the realistic fear of retaliation and adverse
consequences limiting a complainant's future job prospects,19'
186 Id.
187 Hooker, 77 F. Supp. 2d at 758.
188 Id.
189 Id.
190 The issue of whether the employer had "knowledge" of the harassment is
crucial. See George, supra note 90, at 150-54.
'1 See supra notes 36-41 and accompanying text.
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will these judges be able to apply correctly the standard of
"reasonableness" when a plaintiff requests confidentiality.
Since 1980, the law has required employers to take prompt
corrective action as soon as they learn about sexual
harassment.'9 2 Therefore, courts should not regard a plaintiffs
request for confidentiality as a failure to complain, or as an
excuse for an employer's failure to act.
The EEOC offered employers advice on how to deal with
confidentiality requests in its 1999 Guidance on Vicarious
Employer Liability.9 ' The EEOC suggests that employers offer
confidentiality "to the extent possible," but reminds employers
that they cannot guarantee complete confidentiality given their
obligation to conduct an effective investigation. Information
about the allegation of harassment "should be shared only with
those who need to know about it."'94 Noting the conflict between
an employee's request for confidentiality and the employer's
duty to act, the EEOC recommends employer action, because
the employer has a duty to prevent and correct harassment.'
9 5
Inaction by a supervisor who learns of harassment, therefore,
exposes the employer to liability. The EEOC also advises
employers to instruct their supervisors to report any
harassment to appropriate company officials, regardless of
whether a proper complaint has been filed under the company's
anti-harassment policy.'96 Contrary to the reasoning in Torres
and Hooker, in the EEOC's view, a plaintiffs request for
confidentiality should provide no basis for limiting the
employer's liability.
Recognizing an employer's obligation to investigate, the
Ninth Circuit approved an employer policy that promises
complainants only limited confidentiality."'9  Limited-
'9 See EEOC Sexual Harassment Guidelines, § 1604.11(d) & (e) (1980).
193 1999 Guidance, supra note 14.
4 Id. at 7,664.
195 Id.
19 Id. at 7,667-68. "[Djue care requires management to correct harassment
regardless of whether an employee files an internal complaint, if the conduct is clearly
unwelcome." Id. at 7,668. Employers should not wait for an internal complaint to be
filed.
'9' Such a limited confidentiality provision was included in a sexual
harassment prevention policy accorded deference by the court in upholding an
employer's successful defense of a sexual harassment claim in Montero v. AGCO Corp.,
192 F.3d 856 (9th Cir. 1999). AGCO's policy provided that "all information regarding
any specific incident will be kept confidential within the necessary boundaries of the
fact-finding process." Id. at 862 n.5. Montero is discussed infra notes 329-37 and
accompanying text.
In administering the sexual harassment prevention program at the
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confidentiality anti-harassment policies are particularly sound
when coupled with effective policies that also reassure
complainants that they are protected from retaliation for
telling the employer about the harassment. 9 ' As several
practioners point out, it may be impossible for employers to
maintain strict confidentiality while also conducting a proper
investigation into harassment claims.
In stressing the need for immediate and thorough
investigations, one management attorney commented that it is
difficult to maintain a balance between doing a fair and
complete investigation and keeping information confidential:
"when you start asking questions, people are going to obviously
figure out what's going on."'99 Another management attorney
agrees that during an investigation, co-workers will become
aware that something out of the ordinary is taking place, but
she warned that employers must not allow the investigation "to
consume the entire workplace .. .employers [should] warn all
involved parties that the matter is not 'a public event."'00
Acknowledging that employers cannot "gag" employees, a third
management representative urges investigators to minimize
University of California, Davis, the sexual harassment education advisor tells a
potential complainant that once the advisor receives information identifying a possible
harasser, the campus may be obligated to take action. Therefore, confidentiality is
possible only if discussion is nonspecific and information sufficient to identify the
alleged harasser is not disclosed. UNIV. CAL. DAVIS POLICY & PROCEDURE MANUAL §
380-12, VII (2001), available at http://www.mrak.ucdavis.edulweb-mans/manuals.htm
(last visited Sept. 13, 2002). The university seeks to reassure complainants that once a
possible harasser is identified:
[confidentiality and privacy] cannot be guaranteed, but will be protected to as
great a degree as is legally possible. While the expressed wishes of the
complainant regarding confidentiality will be considered, they must be
weighed against the responsibility of the University to act upon the
information and the right of the charged party to receive information about
the allegations.
Id.
The University of California, Davis is a public employer. Consequently,
any employee accused of sexual harassment at work has constitutional due process
rights requiring notice and an opportunity to defend against any allegations of
misconduct before discipline may occur. The university's policy, therefore, specifies that
even during an informal resolution process, the "charged party" has a right to the name
of the complainant and the charge. Id. If a formal complaint or grievance is filed
against a harasser, more elaborate procedures are followed.
198 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1996), also known as § 704(a) of Title VII.
AGCO's policy assured potential complainants that "no reprisals against the employee
reporting the allegation of sexual harassment will be tolerated." Montero, 192 F.3d at
862 n.5.
. See Simon Nadel, Thorough Examination of Complaints Is Not Without
Pitfalls, Experts Warn, 162 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 329, 331 (Nov. 15, 1999) (remarks of
John M. Husband).
'0' See id. (remarks of Barbara Berish Brown).
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the intrusiveness of any investigation and emphasize to each
witness interviewed the need to be discreet: "Instead of
threatening witnesses into keeping the matter quiet,
investigators should inform them that it is in everyone's
interest to keep the information as confidential as possible."'
The federal courts must begin to apply the Supreme
Court's affirmative defense in an even-handed way, without
denying plaintiffs their rights to recovery because they request
confidentiality when complaining to employers. A confidential
complaint is still a complaint, putting the employer on notice
and triggering the employer's obligation to take action. An
employer should not be able to insulate itself from liability by
an over-generous promise of confidentiality to a frightened
victim of harassment.
As the foregoing analysis of recent cases reveals, federal
courts are allowing employers to easily escape liability for
workplace sexual harassment. At the root of this problem is the
courts' reluctance to require evidence that employers' anti-
harassment policies are actually effective. The next section
offers a proposal to increase the effectiveness of prevention
policies.
III. A PROPOSAL TO INCREASE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF AN
EMPLOYER'S PREVENTION POLICY
To effectively prevent sexual harassment, the federal
courts must reinterpret the affirmative defense to require
stronger action from employers to address women's fears of
retaliation for filing complaints. Telling women they have the
right to file retaliation claims once their fears are realized and
they lose their jobs does nothing to encourage women to trust
their employers. Employers must take concrete action and
demonstrate effective results before women will take the risk of
complaining about harassment.
Under Title VII, courts should require an employer to
demonstrate the effectiveness of its prevention policy by
documenting for employees the actions it took in addressing
prior sexual harassment complaints. Furthermore, the
employer should provide information about the resolution of
prior complaints to employees on a regular basis. These steps
would communicate to women that their fears are, in fact,
201 See id. (remarks of Jan Duffy).
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unreasonable, and that they should be willing to report
harassment in a timely fashion. If employers do not voluntarily
release information to employees about the resolution of prior
complaints, plaintiffs' attorneys should seek such information
in future cases in order to evaluate the effectiveness of
employer procedures and to challenge an employer's claim of
reasonable care under the affirmative defense.
A. Require an Employer to Release Aggregate Data to
Employees About the Resolution of Prior Sexual
Harassment Complaints
Currently, few employers release any information to
employees about the existence or resolution of workplace
complaints, including sexual harassment complaints. Since the
affirmative defense obligates women to complain, however,
information about the fate of prior complaints is crucial. To
give women confidence in the employer's complaint procedures,
employers should be required to publish, on a regular basis, an
aggregate listing of prior sexual harassment complaints and
what remedial action the employer took to resolve the
complaints. Providing data on an annual basis would
demonstrate an employer's willingness to "promptly correct"
any sexual harassment problems. In turn, this information
would increase women's courage and would assist them in
overcoming their fears of complaining. It would also help
prevent future sexual harassment, deterring would-be
harassers by informing them that such behavior could result in
discipline or discharge. This annual report should delete any
identifying information, to protect both the complainant's and
any alleged harasser's identities."2 To give employees sufficient
information to evaluate the report, however, it should describe
the type of harassment that occurred and the steps the
employer took to end the harassment.
Language in both Ellerth and Faragher supports such a
policy. In creating the affirmative defense in Ellerth, the Court
relied on Title VII policy to encourage the creation of anti-
harassment policies and "effective grievance mechanisms."2 3 In
202 Obviously, such an aggregate report would be possible only by large
employers. If the workplace is small, with less than fifty employees, even with an
'aggregate" report, the identities of complainants and alleged harassers would
probably become known.
203 Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 764 (1998).
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Faragher, Justice Souter justified limiting employer liability
where the employer has provided a "proven, effective
mechanism for reporting and resolving complaints of sexual
harassment, available to the employee without undue risk or
expense."2 °4
On what basis is a court to decide if an employer's anti-
harassment policy is "effective," or has "proven" to be effective?
As time goes by, employers will be obligated to produce some
past history on how they handled previous sexual harassment
claims, particularly if women testify about facts that
undermine the alleged effectiveness of employer policies.
Although few such fact patterns have appeared in federal
cases, in time more plaintiffs will testify that they "reasonably"
failed to complain because other women complained and either
nothing was done to stop the harassment, or they suffered
adverse employment consequences. If employers want to
continue benefiting from the affirmative defense, they will need
to show more than the simple existence of an anti-harassment
policy and occasional employee training. They will need
concrete data on the resolution of prior complaints.
Despite the Supreme Court's current reliance on
published anti-harassment procedures, women need stronger
assurances to come forward and complain about sexual
harassment at work. Many employers conduct training
programs for supervisors and employees on the prevention of
sexual harassment. Studies indicate, however, that employee
training and education programs are not effective in changing
employee/supervisor attitudes. 5  In the area of sexual
harassment training, in particular, studies found mixed
results, offering only weak support for the theory that trainees
will translate what they learn in a training program into the
actual work environment."6 More alarming, some studies
demonstrated that training programs that raise controversial
issues, such as sexual harassment, can actually increase
employee hostility, misunderstandings and backlash against
presumably protected groups.0 7 Over time, employers will not
20 Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 806 (1998).
25 Professor Susan Bisom-Rapp, in An Ounce of Prevention Is a Poor
Substitute for a Pound of Cure: Confronting the Developing Jurisprudence of Education
and Prevention in Employment Discrimination Law, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1
(2001), documents at length the inadequacy of employee training programs in reducing
discriminatory attitudes of supervisors and other employees.
Id. at 35, 37-38.
Id. at 40-41.
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be able to rely on the simple existence of harassment
prevention and training programs; they will have to
demonstrate results.
Both management attorneys and the EEOC advise
employers to keep detailed records of their responses to
harassment complaints."°8 The purpose of such records is to
help employers prove they have taken the steps necessary to
mount a successful affirmative defense in case an employee
sues for sexual harassment. An important benefit of this
record-keeping system is that this information could be used to
foster employees' trust in the employer by demonstrating that
the employer is serious about enforcing its policy against
sexual harassment. Assuming employers act on the advice
given to them by their attorneys and the EEOC, employers
currently have the information from which to craft meaningful
reports to employees on the actual enforcement of sexual
harassment prevention programs. Assuming most large
employers already track such information, courts would not be
placing an undue burden on employers by requiring the
collation and dissemination of this information to employees.
An annual report on the number, type and resolution of
sexual harassment complaints would assist the employer in
changing workplace norms to reduce the number and severity
of sexual harassment incidents as well as other forms of
discrimination against women."' When internal dispute
resolution processes remain highly individualized and private,
they provide no opportunity for learning, or for change within a
private company or public institution."' Internal systems that
remain confidential frustrate "the development of shared
understandings of public norms and knowledge of effective
remedial responses." 1' Professor Susan Sturm suggests that to
208 See, e.g., Steven D. Baderian et al., Managing Employment Risks in Light
of the New Rulings in Sexual Harassment Law, 21 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 343 (1999).
"An employer should keep a complete record of its preventive programs, . . . all
complaints received and investigated, and any remediation efforts taken." Id. at 367.
The EEOC in its Guidance on sexual harassment liability advises
employers to keep records of all harassment complaints: "Without such records, the
employer could be unaware of a pattern of harassment by the same individual. Such a
pattern would be relevant to credibility assessments and disciplinary measures." 1999
Guidance, supra note 14, at 7,668.
209 Workplace norms are significant in predicting whether sexual harassment
will occur. See Beiner, Sex, Science and Social Knowledge, supra note 37, at 294-300.
'1o See Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A
Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458, 545 (2001).
211 Id. at 545.
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address the entrenched nature of workplace bias, courts should
encourage employers "to develop the capacity to evaluate their
own systems, rewarding employers who do so."2 12 Employers
have been on notice since 1998, and arguably since Meritor
Savings v. Vinson213 in 1986, that they should have sexual
harassment prevention programs in place. It is time that the
federal courts require some proof from employers that their
prevention programs are "effective" in fact, not just in theory.
Some commentators suggest that under the EllerthiFaragher
affirmative defense, employers should be required to make an
actual factual showing of what they have done to prevent
harassment.214 Release of aggregate data to employees on the
resolution of past complaints would help demonstrate actual
effectiveness.
Large employers, particularly those in the public sector,
have considerable experience with extensive sexual
harassment prevention programs. One example is the City of
Chicago, which set up a sexual harassment office as an
independent division of city government in 1994.215 That office
found that in training employees to prevent sexual harassment
from occurring, it was particularly effective to tell employees
about previous disciplinary action taken against harassers. 6
Potential harassers need real data from their employers
regarding the type of discipline they may expect, just as
potential complainants need real data to convince them that it
makes more sense to report harassment than to endure it.
Universities are another group of employers with a long
record of handling sexual harassment complaints. Universities
deal with sexual harassment issues not only in the context of
employment, but also in the educational context, where Title IX
also prohibits sexual harassment.117 In 1981, the University of
California adopted a system-wide policy prohibiting sexual
212 Id. at 559.
213 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
214 See, e.g., Beiner, Sex, Science and Social Knowledge, supra note 37, at 327.
In addition to proving it has an effective prevention program in place, the employer
should also be required to present evidence on the local norms in the workplace. Id.
215 Andra Gomberg, Beyond Politics as Usual: the City of Chicago Sexual
Harassment Office, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 27 (1999).
216 Id. at 51. Chicago's Sexual Harassment Officer comments: "While some
employees may be sensitized to the issue through training, other employees are more
likely to be deterred from engaging in sexual harassment by learning about
disciplinary action that has actually been imposed by the employer." Id.
21' Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688
(1994).
20021
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
harassment and establishing prevention procedures.21 My
campus, the University of California, Davis, adopted a local
policy in 1984 and began designating campus officials to serve
as sexual harassment advisors in the early 1980s. Despite their
long experience, however, universities have not been all that
successful in preventing sexual harassment on campus.21
Furthermore, few universities make public any information
about how many sexual harassment complaints are filed by
faculty, staff or students. °
After an in-depth study of university sexual harassment
procedures, one scholar concludes: "[T]he persistence of
harassment on campus, notwithstanding almost two decades of
anti-harassment policies... strongly suggests that policies and
procedures alone do not work."' What matters is the response
of the university to the internal complaint. A perception that
the university will take the complaint seriously and will
actually punish the harasser significantly affects a woman's
willingness to use university procedures.2 Unless information
is available to employees or students about what happens to
sexual harassment complaints, the percentage of harassed
women willing to use university sexual harassment procedures
will remain low. If a university wants to take advantage of the
affirmative defense created in Ellerth and Faragher, then a
court should require the university to provide empirical data on
the effectiveness of its prevention and reporting procedures. A
university should be required to provide data on what percent
of harassed women actually report harassment and why the
remaining women do not report, what percent of claims are
... UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, UNIVERSITY
POLICY ON SEXUAL HARASSMENT (Aug. 11, 1981).
"" See Lawton, supra note 36, at 75 (stating that incidence of sexual
harassment has not declined over twenty years; internal reporting procedures
discourage the filing of internal complaints). In a campus study conducted at the
University of Arizona between 1993 and 1994, 30% of women faculty and staff reported
sexually insulting comments from men, 18% reported inappropriate sexual touching,
and 2% said they had left a job at the university because of sexual harassment. Id. at
91. Among students, 13% reported that faculty members had made seductive remarks
about the person's appearance or sexual activity, 7% reported unwanted sexual
attention from faculty, and 4% reported faculty had made sexual advances a "few times
or more." Id. Despite the results of this anonymous survey, only 0.6% of women
students at Arizona annually file a report of harassment with the university. Id. at 90.
211 Id. at 87. Lawton requested data from ten universities. She received some
information on the number of complaints filed from five of them. Id. at 88-89, 150-51.
2.1 Id. at 109.
222 Id. at 140.
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found to merit a remedial response and what the response has
been.223
University efforts to deal with sexual harassment
illustrate the dilemma encountered by most employers in this
area. On the one hand, a university implements procedures to
help end sexual harassment and make the work (and
educational) environment comfortable for women. In a broader
context, sexual harassment prevention programs are an effort
to eliminate one source of discrimination against women. On
the other hand, as an employer, a university is interested in
limiting its liability. These two contradictory purposes underlie
most employers' efforts to eliminate any type of discrimination
in employment. The offices and individuals responsible for
carrying out university sexual harassment prevention
programs experience these conflicting goals throughout their
work.224 Within a large public university system, the conflict
between prevention and avoidance of liability expresses itself
in disagreements over whether to publish annual reports with
non-identifying aggregate data on the incidence and resolution
of sexual harassment complaints.22
In a recent study of the sexual harassment prevention
programs at eight public university campuses, only one
publishes an annual report, even though those working on
sexual harassment prevention efforts at all the campuses agree
that such an annual report would be very valuable: "[It] would
be effective in serving three very important yet diverse
functions: building trust in the dispute process by
demonstrating to the campus community that once a complaint
was made it was taken seriously; educating the campus
community about sexual harassment; and deterring potential
harassers."226
Universities do not report even summary information
because they fear such a report would hurt their reputation,
create an "image problem," be used against them in future
litigation or actually encourage more complaints.22 The study's
author concluded, "the university's competing goal of protecting
223 Id. at 144.
224 See Jennie Kihnley, Unraveling the Ivory Fabric: Institutional Obstacles to
the Handling of Sexual Harassment Complaints, 25 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 69, 70, 80
(2000).
225 Id. at 81.
226 Id.
227 Id. at 82.
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the institution outweighs the benefits" of producing such a
report. 2 If universities realized, however, that reporting data
on the resolution of complaints would both help prevent further
harassment and assist them in proving the effectiveness of
their complaint procedures, they might be willing to release
aggregate data on a voluntary basis. If not, the courts may be
called upon to require them and all other employers to produce
such actual data during litigation.
Publishing aggregate data on internal resolution of
sexual harassment complaints would go a long way in
destroying some of the myths that surround sexual harassment
in employment. It would show employees, both men and
women, that sexual harassment is not an isolated issue limited
to personal misunderstandings between employees about a
possible sexual relationship. Concrete data on sexual
harassment at work will demonstrate that most incidents are
not just "personal frolics" of a few boorish men, as the courts
like to believe,229 but that harassment is a systemic problem
that infects many women's daily work lives. Annual reports
will destroy much of the secrecy that infects sexual harassment
issues and will help educate women that they do not need to
request confidentiality when they file a complaint. Release of
data will help women overcome their own personal
embarrassment and fear that somehow they brought the
harassment on themselves; that somehow they "asked for it."
Additionally, it will help both management and employees
treat sexual harassment as just one more type of workplace
misconduct that must be dealt with in a open and decisive way.
228 Id. at 83.
229 In Ellerth, Justice Kennedy commented: "As Courts of Appeals have
recognized, a supervisor acting out of gender-based animus or a desire to fulfill sexual
urges may not be actuated by a purpose to serve the employer .... The harassing
supervisor often acts for personal motives, motives unrelated and even antithetical to
the objectives of the employer." Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 756-57
(1998). Thus, he concluded: "the general rule is that sexual harassment by a supervisor
is not conduct within the scope of employment." Id. at 757. In Faragher, Justice Souter
commented: "[T]he courts have emphasized that harassment consisting of unwelcome
remarks and touching is motivated solely by individual desires and serves no purpose
of the employer. For this reason, courts have likened hostile environment sexual
harassment to the classic 'frolic and detour' for which an employer has no vicarious
liability." Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 794 (1998).
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B. Require an Employer to Release Information About Prior
Incidents to Other Employees Who Must Continue to
Work With a Known Harasser
Large employers, primarily public employers, face the
problem of repeat harassers. These employers may need to take
an additional step to prevent further sexual harassment after
retaining a known harasser. If an employer is relatively small,
with less than fifty employees, word circulates rather quickly
through the workforce when a supervisor or other employee is
suspended or terminated for sexual harassment. If an employer
is large, however, only isolated groups of employees may
become aware of an employee's suspension." ° Among private
sector employers, once they determine that a supervisor
harassed an employee, they often terminate the harasser."'
Among public sector employers, however, harassers are less
likely to be terminated because of the greater protections such
employees enjoy under civil service systems and
constitutionally-mandated due process procedural
requirements.232 When an employer properly investigates a
230 If discipline takes the form of a formal warning or a letter in the harasser's
personnel file, other employees may not know that anything happened.
231 For example, in Matvia v. Bald Head Island Management, Inc., 259 F.3d
261 (4th Cir. 2001) the employer immediately suspended and then terminated the
harasser twelve days later after investigation. In Barrett v. Applied Radiant Energy
Corp., 240 F.3d 262 (4th Cir. 2001) the employer terminated the harasser one week
after the employer learned of the harassment and as soon as the investigation was
completed. In Hill v. American General Finance, Inc., 218 F.3d 639, 642 (7th Cir. 2000),
the harasser was not terminated but was transferred to another office, given a written
warning, and his pay was reduced by $10,000. Id. at 642.
If the harasser works under a collective bargaining agreement, the
harasser will have the opportunity to contest his termination through a grievance
procedure, and if his union representative agrees, through arbitration. Arbitrators
have occasionally reinstated terminated harassers when they have determined the
employer did not have sufficient "just cause" to terminate him. See, e.g., Westvaco v.
United Paperworkers, 171 F.3d 971 (4th Cir. 1999). See also Franklin, supra, note 91,
for comprehensive data on the reinstatement of harassers by labor arbitrators.
232 If employment is in the public sector, any employee disciplined for
misconduct will have certain due process rights, including the right to notice of any
charges filed against him and the right to respond. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v.
Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1984). See also Kihnley, supra note 224, at 79 (citing a public
university's policy on sexual harassment). These due process rights, however, do not
restrict the public employer's ability to conduct a thorough investigation, interview
anyone who would have relevant information and discipline or discharge the harasser
after an evidentiary hearing.
For an example of a decision to retain a harasser in public employment, see
Brown v. Perry, 184 F.3d 388 (4th Cir. 1999). The harasser was chief of safety and
security for the eastern region of the Army and Air Force Exchange Service of the U.S.
Department of Defense, stationed in Texas. After his superiors became aware of his
alleged harassment of the plaintiff, stationed in Maryland, the Department of Defense
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sexual harassment complaint and determines that harassment
occurred, but does not discharge the harasser, what steps
should be required to protect other women from further
harassment?
In this situation, aggregate reports on the resolution of
prior incidents are not sufficient. If an employer continues to
employ a harassing supervisor or other employee, employers
should be obligated to inform employees who must work with
the harasser about the resolution of the prior complaint and
any discipline taken. Otherwise, if the person harasses another
employee, the employer should be liable for greater damages
for the subsequent harassment.23
Employers have long stressed the confidentiality of
personnel matters, but employers voluntarily assume such
confidentiality to protect their interests.234  As previously
issued a restraining order against him, prohibiting him from having any direct or
indirect contact with the plaintiff or anyone assigned to her office in Maryland. Eight
months later, after an investigation, the harasser received a thirty-day suspension for
his two sexual assaults of plaintiff. Id. at 392. Plaintiff Brown's complaints against this
high-ranking officer in the Exchange Service were the second set of multiple
complaints lodged against him, but he was still not terminated. Id.
See also Johnson v. West, 218 F.3d 725 (7th Cir. 2000). In Johnson, the
harasser was chief of police for a Veterans Administration hospital. The director of the
hospital learned of the alleged harassment in January 1992. An investigation was
completed in November 1992, and at that time the harasser was removed as chief of
police and transferred to another area. Id. at 729. However, in May 1993, the harasser
was reinstated as chief of police as the result of an investigative review board's
findings. Id.
'3 Since 1991, employers can be held liable for punitive damages under Title
VII. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (1991). The Eleventh Amendment, however, bars punitive
damage awards against state agencies. See JOEL FRIEDMAN & GEORGE STRICKLER, THE
LAW OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 735 (5th ed. 2001).
'3 In California, both public and private sector employees can claim some
privacy rights under the state constitution. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1 (amended 1972).
California's explicit privacy clause applies to both public and private sector
employment. See Hill v. NCAA, 865 P.2d 633 (Cal. 1994) (holding that privacy clause
applies to both public and private entities). It protects employees from disclosure of
private information, such as medical information, to third parties. It does not, however,
protect employees from the disclosure of employment-related information to others at
the place of employment who have a legitimate reason to receive the information. See
Valley Presbyterian Hosp. v. Superior Court, 94 Cal. Rptr. 2d 137 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000)
(ordering the hospital to disclose names and addresses of employees to a third party
suing the hospital for wrongful death; because of compelling need, such disclosure to an
outside party is only a minimal intrusion on an employees' right to privacy). Compare
Bd. of Trs. of Stanford Univ. v. Superior Court, 174 Cal. Rptr. 160 (1st Dist. 1981)
(denying one employee suing the university access to another employee's complete
personnel file and holding that any invasion of another's privacy rights must be
narrowly drawn), with Randi W. v. Muroc Joint Unified Sch. Dist., 929 P.2d 582 (Cal.
1997) (holding a former employer liable for negligent misrepresentation in giving new
employers positive reference for employee without disclosing the employee's prior
sexual misconduct with female students).
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discussed, employers cannot keep sexual harassment
complaints strictly confidential because of their obligation to
investigate and correct any harassment that has occurred.235
Men who have been disciplined for harassment obviously share
the employer's interest in confidentiality. Their interest in
secrecy, however, is outweighed by the employer's obligation to
correct the harassment and prevent future harassment from
occurring.238  Once an employer conducts an adequate
investigation, determines that harassment has occurred and
disciplines the harasser, the harasser has no viable claim
against an employer for releasing relevant information to other
employees about the incident and its resolution.237
Currently, employers are reluctant to release any
information about identifiable harassers. Employers appear
fearful that such harassers will file defamation or other civil
claims against them for releasing information about the
harassment determination. Such fears are misplaced.
Men who have been terminated for sexual harassment
have little protection from disclosure of information about
workplace complaints filed against them. These limited
confidentiality rights are illustrated by the unsuccessful
lawsuits filed by terminated employees asserting a variety of
state law claims, such as defamation, negligent infliction of
emotional distress or wrongful discharge. Claims filed by
terminated harassers were generally unsuccessful before the
Supreme Court's 1998 sexual harassment decisions.238 Courts
are even more likely to reject such claims under current law
because of the affirmative defense's renewed emphasis on
employer procedures to promptly correct sexual harassment.239
,5 See discussion, supra notes 153-155, 193-196 and accompanying text.
"6 See Malik v. Carrier Corp., 202 F.3d 97, 106 (2d Cir. 2000) ("As with any
investigation into potentially embarrassing personal interactions, confidentiality is
difficult or impossible to maintain if all pertinent information is to be acquired from all
possible sources.").
2 See 1999 Guidance, supra note 14, at 7,666 n.69.
238 See KAY & WEST, supra note 173, at 835-36.
2'9 Employers have met the requirement to take "prompt and effective"
corrective action by beginning an investigation within thirty-six hours of a
complainant's report, and by terminating the accused harasser within six to ten days.
See Allan H. Weitzman, Employer Defenses to Sexual Harassment Claims, 6 DUKE J.
GENDER L. & POL. 27, 55 (1999).
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1. Defamation Claims by Harassers are Generally
Unsuccessful
Men who have claimed defamation after being
terminated for sexual harassment have had little success
proving such a claim. A "qualified privilege" protects workplace
communications among supervisors and employees in
defamation actions.24° Regardless of whether employment-
related communications are true or false, communications
made in the normal course of business are "privileged,"
shielding the employer from liability for defamation.24' To
overcome the privilege, an employee claiming defamation must
prove "abuse" of the privilege by the employer, usually
requiring the defamed employee to prove some form of
"malice."242 Employees terminated for sexual harassment have
240 See DAN DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 1159-61 (2000) (stating that because of
a shared interest, an employer has a privilege to explain to employees why other
employees were discharged).
241 Truth is an absolute defense to a defamation claim, but, first, the parties
litigate whether the work place communications are "privileged." If "privileged," then a
jury will never have the opportunity to decide an underlying issue of whether the
sexual harassment complaint was true or false.
Only a few cases have gone to a jury, resulting in a decision on the truth or
falsity of the sexual harassment charges. In one defamation case, the jury decided the
harassment charges were false and awarded damages to the terminated supervisor.
See Hines v. Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co., 613 So. 2d 646 (La. App. 1993). The court of
appeal, however, reversed the jury verdict as not supported by the evidence; many
women employees had testified, describing Hines's repeated sexually harassing
behavior. The appellate court further found that the employer had the right to rely on
the outcome of its investigation in disciplining and then terminating Hines, and found
that the employer's communications regarding Hines's discharge were privileged.
In a wrongful discharge case, Cotran v. Rollins Hudig Hall International,
Inc., 948 P.2d 412 (Cal. 1998), the California Supreme Court found that the alleged
harasser had not been wrongfully discharged, even though the jury found that no
sexual harassment had occurred because the sexual relationships at issue were
consensual. In reversing the jury verdict, the court held that the employer had
conducted a fair investigation, reaching a "reasoned conclusion" that harassment had
occurred. The employer was justified in relying on its internal review and resolution.
The jury's $1.7 million verdict for the alleged harasser was reversed.
242 Defamation claims normally arise under state law and the states apply a
variety of standards on what constitutes abuse of a qualified or conditional privilege. In
many states, defamation plaintiffs must prove common law malice-that the published
communication was made with ill will, spite and for the express purpose of harming
the employee. See DOBBS, supra note 240, at 1165-67. In Rudebeck v. Paulson, 612
N.W.2d 450 (Minn. App. 2000), the court explained, "Statements made 'in the course of
investigating or punishing employee misconduct' are generally privileged, based on the
employer's interest in protecting against harmful employees .... Once it has been
shown that a conditional privilege applies, the plaintiff must prove actual malice to
recover." Id. at 453 (citations omitted). The court defined actual malice as "actual ill
will, or a design causelessly and wantonly to injure plaintiff." Id. at 454 (citations
omitted). Because the employer conducted a reasonable and thorough investigation of
the sexual harassment complaint filed by another employee, the plaintiff was unable to
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generally not been able to prove abuse of the employer's
privilege to communicate work-related information to other
employees.
In Duffy v. Leading Edge Products, Inc.,243 the Fifth
Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the employer based on
Texas defamation law. The court found that both internal
accusations made by an employer about an employee's
misconduct, and subsequent references given by an employer to
someone with "a common interest" in this employment-related
information, were protected by a "qualified or conditional"
privilege.2" The Fifth Circuit agreed that Duffy presented no
evidence of malice. The employer conducted a reasonable
investigation and the human resource manager believed that
Duffy made unwelcome sexual advances to two women
employees, discrediting Duffy's version of events. 4 ' Duffy had
no evidence that the human resource manager "had a high
degree of awareness that the underlying facts as reported to
her were probably false," or that the sexual harassment
complaints were probably fabricated.246 Under this standard of
actual malice, the Fifth Circuit commented that, even if an
employer's actions in terminating an employee demonstrated
"[niegligence, lack of investigation, or failure to act as a
reasonably prudent person," this would be insufficient proof for
a plaintiff to prove malice under defamation law. 47
prove malice. Id.
In other jurisdictions, defamation plaintiffs must prove a form of
constitutional malice, based on the Supreme Court's decision in New York Times v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). Under this standard, a plaintiff must prove that the
employer knew the accusation was probably false or acted recklessly without regard to
the truth or falsity of the accusation. See DOBBS, supra note 240, at 1167.
In a few states, a showing of negligence on the employer's part may be
sufficient for a plaintiff to prove abuse of the privilege. See Davis v. Res. of Human
Dev., Inc., 770 A.2d 353, 359 (Pa. Super. 2001); DOBBS, supra note 240, at 1166 n.6.
24 44 F.3d 308 (5th Cir. 1995).
Id. at 312. Duffy was suing for defamation under federal diversity
jurisdiction, claiming that the sexual harassment allegations against him were false
and that he would be compelled to republish these false allegations in telling a
prospective employer why he had been terminated. Id. at 310. Because any future
publication of the reasons for his termination would be privileged, the issue in the case
was whether he could prove "malice" on the part of the employer. Id. at 312.
"' Id. at 311.
246 Id. at 314.
241 Id. at 313, 315, 316 (footnote omitted). The court also found that Dufly
could not prove actual malice even if the incidents for which he was terminated did not
actually rise to the level of sexual harassment as required by current U.S. Supreme
Court interpretations of Title VII. The court commented that sexual harassment "has a
vernacular meaning that encompasses a far broader range of misconduct than would be
actionable under Title VII. There is no basis to conclude that Leading Edge did not
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Another possible way for a terminated employee to
prove abuse of the privilege protecting an employer's workplace
communications is to prove "excessive publication"-that the
employer distributed the allegedly defamatory information
outside the workplace. In Garziano v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours
& Co.,"24 the company distributed a memo to all its supervisors
four days after plaintiff Garziano's termination for sexual
harassment. Once the company learned about the sexual
harassment, through an exit interview of a woman who quit
because of Garziano's harassment, it conducted a thorough and
prompt investigation.249 On the day Garziano was terminated,
rumors began to circulate in the plant among the
approximately 400 rank-and-file employees.25 ° In response to
the rumors, three days later Du Pont issued a "management
information bulletin" to its 140 supervisors.25" ' The "Sexual
Harassment" bulletin advised supervisors that the "recent
sexual harassment incident" resulting in an employee's
termination "was determined to be a serious act of employee
misconduct . . . [and] deliberate, repeated and unsolicited
physical contact as well as significant verbal abuse [were]
involved in this case."2 "' The bulletin further quoted at length
from the EEOC Guidelines defining sexual harassment,
advising employees about their rights to complain and
discussing the obligation of the company to eliminate any
harassment.52 Supervisors were told to discuss the key points
with their employees.254 Some read the bulletin to employees,
but the bulletin was not posted or distributed to employees.
The company's regular practice was to keep matters of
employee discipline confidential as long as the person
believe that Duffy had engaged in sexual harassment in this vernacular sense." Id. at
315-16.
248 818 F.2d 380 (5th Cir. 1987).
249 As in so many cases, when the woman quit and the employment relations
supervisor conducted the exit interview, he learned for the first time about prior
harassment incidents that the woman never reported to the employment relations
office. Her supervisor, who knew about the earlier harassment, had also not reported it
to employment relations. At trial, this supervisor testified that the harassed woman
had asked him not to do anything about the prior incidents because "her job would be
in jeopardy and she would have a harder time than she was having now." Id. at 383
n.3.
250 Id. at 383, 393.
251 Id. at 384, 396.
252 Id. at 383-84.
253 Garziano, 818 F.2d at 396.
254 Id. at 384.
255 Id.
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continued to be employed at the plant.256 Once an employee was
terminated, however, the company communicated the basic
reason for the termination to supervisors so they could relay
the information to employees." 7 Garziano subsequently sued
for libel and slander under principles of Mississippi law.
Although Du Pont moved for a directed verdict on the
grounds that the communication was privileged and Garziano
had not proven malice, the trial court reserved ruling on Du
Pont's motion and sent the case to the jury. The jury awarded
Garziano $93,000 in compensatory damages, but denied
punitive damages, finding Du Pont "exhibited no malice,
recklessness, or wanton disregard" in publishing the bulletin.258
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit reversed Garziano's judgment for
damages and remanded on a narrow issue.
The Fifth Circuit found that Du Pont's bulletin was a
privileged communication: "[c]o-workers have a legitimate
interest in the reasons a fellow employee was discharged."259
Furthermore, under Title VII the employer is obligated to take
strong measures to eradicate hostile or offensive work
environments. Consequently, the Fifth Circuit found the trial
court erred in not instructing the jury that Du Pont's bulletin
was a privileged communication. Once an employment
communication is privileged, a presumption of good faith
arises, which can be rebutted by proof of malice, bad faith or
abuse of the privilege by excessive publication. 60 The Fifth
Circuit found the evidence did not support a finding of Du
Pont's bad faith or malice.26' The company's motivation for
sending the communication to supervisors was to meet its
affirmative duty to eliminate any possible intimidating or
hostile work environments caused by sexual harassment and to
defend its termination of Garziano.262 These were both
justifiable reasons for the privileged communication and the
court concluded that "an employer's publication to its
employees of the reasons for discharge of a co-worker is not
256 Id. 384 n.6.
257 Id.
258 Garziano, 818 F.2d at 384. Garziano had evidently succeeded in convincing
the jury that the sexual harassment charges filed against him were false.
259 Id. at 387.
'6 Id. at 388. To prove malice, it is not enough for the plaintiff to prove the
allegations contained in the communication were false. The plaintiff must also prove
that the employer knew the allegations were false when it published them. Id. at 389.
261 Id. at 391.
262 Id.
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only a proper purpose, but is one of the most fitting occasions
for application of a qualified privilege."26
One issue remained. The Fifth Circuit explained that an
employer could abuse the qualified privilege by "excessive
publication" if the scope of the communication exceeded what
was necessary, or if it was published "to persons not within the
'circle' of those people who have a legitimate and direct interest
in the subject matter."" There were employees of a
subcontractor working on the premises, who would not have a
legitimate interest in the discharge of a Du Pont employee.265
Also, rumors spread to the nearest town twenty miles away."'
The Fifth Circuit remanded the case to determine if Du Pont
abused its privilege by excessive publication. On remand, the
jury would consider the following questions: Did Du Pont
supervisors pass the information to the subcontractor's
employees also working on the premises? Did Du Pont
supervisors communicate to others in the town twenty miles
away? Or did the rumors in town begin circulating before the
company issued its bulletin?2 67 Based on the evidence
presented, it appeared unlikely Garziano would be able to
sustain his burden of proof on these issues on remand.
The employers' investigations in these defamation cases
were ordinary and sensible: the employers interviewed all
relevant parties before deciding that harassment had occurred.
Even when an employer conducts an abusive investigation,
however, resulting in wide-spread, but false, accusations of
sexual misconduct against plaintiffs, plaintiffs have been
unable to recover. In McDonnell v. Cisneros,268 the employer
was the Department of Housing and Urban Development
("HUD"), a federal employer. Someone sent HUD anonymous
allegations of a "lurid" sexual relationship between the male
manager and female assistant manager of one of HUD's Offices
of Inspector General.6 9 Because the Inspector General's Office
usually investigates such accusations, HUD asked
investigators from the Department of Defense to conduct the
investigation. The investigation was hostile and
2r Garziano, 818 F.2d at 392.
264 Id. at 391-92.
265 Id. at 392.
266 Id. at 393.
267 Id. at 394-95.
26 84 F.3d 256 (7th Cir. 1996).
269 Id. at 257.
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unprofessional. The investigators revealed to the employees
they interviewed their belief that the plaintiffs were guilty of
the alleged sexual misconduct, resulting in even more
exaggerated rumors circulating among co-workers about the
plaintiffs' sexually deviant behavior. 7 ° Four months later,
when the investigation was completed, however, plaintiffs were
entirely exonerated and the accusations were found to be
totally false.27' By this time, employees had ostracized the
manager and assistant manager. The company advised them'
not to meet to discuss business behind closed doors, not to
travel together and reassigned the male manager to another
HUD office for ninety days to blunt the rumors generated by
the abusive investigation.272 The plaintiffs asked HUD to find
and discipline the disgruntled employee who filed the
anonymous complaint, but HUD did nothing.7 Both plaintiffs
filed separate sexual harassment complaints, alleging that the
investigation itself, and its resulting adverse effects,
constituted sexual harassment.74
The Seventh Circuit framed the issue as: "whether an
investigation of sexual harassment that exceeds the proper
limits is itself a form of actionable sexual harassment."75 The
court said "no." Title VII obligates employers to investigate
anonymous charges: "employers who disregard charges of sex-
related misconduct by their employees run a considerable risk
of being sanctioned for having tolerated sexual harassment."76
Under the plaintiffs theory, if the employer "wants to
demonstrate how seriously he takes such charges," and "the
investigation oversteps the proper bounds, causing humiliation
to the targets," the employer would also be guilty of sexual
harassment for its over-zealous actions. 77 The Seventh Circuit
declined to put the employer in this predicament, advising
270 Id. at 258.
271 Id.
272 Id.
273 McDonnell, 84 F.3d at 258.
274 Id. The plaintiffs did not file defamation actions because federal law does
not allow for such claims by federal employees against the government. Id. at 261.
Consequently, the plaintiffs tried to sue HUD under Title VII for sexual harassment
and retaliation, but both the district court and the Seventh Circuit found that they
failed to state a claim.
275 Id. at 260.
276 Id.
277 Id. at 261.
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humiliated and falsely accused employees to look elsewhere for
redress, not under Title VII.
278
In one rare case, Meloff v. New York Life Insurance
Co.,279 an employee succeeded in winning a new trial on her
defamation claim, but this case involved a termination for
fraud, not sexual harassment."' The facts differ significantly
from those found in the cases of terminated or disciplined
harassers. Phyllis Meloff commuted to work from Philadelphia
to New York by train.28' Beginning in January 1991, Meloff
charged her monthly Amtrak train pass on her New York Life
corporate credit card. 82 In March or April 1991, Meloff
reimbursed New York Life for her travel through March
1991.283 She continued charging these costs to her corporate
card, but made no further reimbursements through December
1991." In December 1991, New York Life denied Ms. Meloff a
promotion.285  She complained about it, alleging sex
discrimination.288 When she returned to work in January 1992,
after a holiday vacation, she attempted to reimburse the
company for the $3,600 she owed for her commuter train
expenses since March 1991.287 Instead, she was terminated for
making these personal charges on a company card.2
On the day Meloff was terminated, her supervisor sent
an e-mail to seven managers, with the subject heading
"FRAUD" and a message that said Meloff, a valued twenty-
seven-year employee, had been terminated for using her
company credit card "in a way in which the company was
defrauded .... This action reflects our commitment to 'adhere
to the highest ethical standards in all our business dealings.' 2 8
After receiving the e-mail, various managers forwarded it to
more company employees, and a total of sixteen employees
278 McDonnell, 84 F.3d at 261. The Seventh Circuit sustained only one part of
the male manager's claim, a claim for retaliation under Title VII, based on his
allegation that HUD transferred him because he was unable to convince his female
colleague to withdraw her sexual harassment complaint. Id. at 263.
279 240 F.3d 138 (2d Cir. 2001).
280 Id. at 141, 148.
281 Id. at 142.
282 Id. at 143.
283 Id.
284 Meloff, 240 F.3d at 143.
285 Id.
286 Id.
287 Id.
288 Id. at 143-44.
289 Meloff, 240 F.3d at 144.
[Vol. 68: 2
PREVENTING SEXUAL HARASSMENT
received it. 290 About twenty employees called Meloff about her
termination and her use of the company credit card. 91 Meloff
produced evidence that other employees had charged personal
expenses on company credit cards, but the company took no
action against them. 2
Meloff sued for sex discrimination, retaliation and
defamation, but the federal district court granted the
employer's motion for summary judgment on her sex
discrimination claim. 293  The district court allowed her
retaliation and defamation claims to go to the jury.94 The jury
found no retaliation against her for complaining to the
company about sex discrimination in promotions, but awarded
her $250,000 in compensatory damages and $1 million in
punitive damages on her defamation claim. 295 The district court
then overturned the jury verdict, granting judgment for New
York Life as a matter of law. 96
The Second Circuit reversed the trial court's
judgment. 97 The Court of Appeals agreed that New York Life
enjoyed a qualified privilege to communicate information of
common interest to its employees: "the termination of a fellow
employee may be considered a matter in which co-workers
share a common interest."299 To rebut the presumption of good
faith created by this qualified privilege, Meloff first had to
prove that the company's statement was false, and second that
New York Life abused its privilege by acting with malice. 99 She
had to prove that New York Life "acted with knowledge that
the statement was false or with reckless disregard as to its
truth.""' Applying this standard, the Second Circuit held that
the district court erred in overturning the jury's verdict.30' The
Second Circuit found sufficient evidence in the record to
support the jury's finding that the fraud accusation was "not
substantially true" and that New York Life's actions reached
Id. at 141, 144.
' Id. at 144.
292 Id.
Id. at 142.
24 Meloff, 240 F.3d at 142.
295 Id.
296 Id.
297 Id.
29 Id. at 146.
299 Meloff, 240 F.3d at 146.
300 Id.
301 Id.
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the level of "actual malice.""2 The court remanded the case for a
new trial on Meloffs defamation claim." 3
Despite Meloffs success on appeal, employees
terminated for sexual harassment have not successfully
challenged under defamation law the release of information
about their terminations by their employers to company
employees or to prospective employers." 4 Consequently, some
employees (and their lawyers) have used other theories to
prevent employers from circulating information about their
sexually harassing behavior among employees at work.
2. Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress Claims by
Harassers Have Been Unsuccessful
A few harassers have attempted to sue employers on a
theory of negligent infliction of emotional distress for the
emotional harm they suffered from a sexual harassment
investigation. This theory of recovery has been no more
successful than defamation claims.
In Malik v. Carrier Corp. ,35 a terminated employee sued
for negligent infliction of emotional distress, in addition to
defamation, negligent misrepresentation and tortious
interference with contract. Mr. Malik, a recent business school
graduate, entered the company's executive training program in
August 1992.306 During the initial orientation program, one
woman complained about Malik's "highly arrogant and
disrespectful behavior" towards her."7 Malik's performance
received mixed reviews as he rotated through different
divisions of the company during the following year and a half.0 8
In March 1994, the recruitment manager in charge of the
training program began investigating a second complaint that
Malik made inappropriate sexual comments to a woman
302 Id. at 147.
303 Id.
304 See also Malik v. Carrier Corp., 202 F.3d 97, 109 (2d Cir. 2000) (affirming
trial court's dismissal of defamation claim; communication about an employee's
sexually harassing behavior was probably true, and no evidence existed of malice);
Deutsch v. Chesapeake Ctr., 27 F. Supp. 2d 642 (D. Md. 1998). In Deutsch, the court
commented: "Even a failure to investigate fully does not constitute malice" in a
defamation claim. Id. at 645.
305 202 F.3d 97 (2d Cir. 2000).
306 Id. at 100.
307 Id.
308 Id.
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employee on several occasions." 9 During the investigation, the
complaining woman wanted to drop her complaint, but the
company discovered that another woman had also complained
about Malik's sexual remarks."' The supervisor involved had
not forwarded this additional complaint to the recruitment
manager. " ' When the recruitment manager met with Malik, he
admitted one remark, but denied all other allegations3" Four
days later, the company informed Malik that it would not
discipline him, but would place a letter in his personnel file. 13
The letter stated that, although there was evidence of
discussions of a sexual nature between him and one of the
women, there was not enough evidence "to substantiate the
claim of sexual harassment."1 " Nevertheless, the letter told
Malik that his behavior "was unacceptable."16 In August 1994,
the company terminated Malik from the training program
because none of the company divisions offered him a job.816
Malik sued in federal court based on diversity
jurisdiction over his state law tort claims. The trial court
dismissed the defamation and contract interference claims, but
allowed the negligent infliction of emotional distress and
negligent misrepresentation claims to go to the jury. The jury
found for the employer on the misrepresentation claim, but
found for the employee on the emotional distress claim,
awarding Malik $400,000 in damages, which the trial court
subsequently reduced to $120,000."'
The Second Circuit reversed Malik's verdict for
negligent infliction of emotional distress, ruling that the trial
court should have granted judgment for the company as a
matter of law."8 The Second Circuit found that even if
Connecticut law allowed such a claim, uncertain under state
law, Connecticut law must conform to federal law, which
required the employer to investigate the sexual harassment
complaint.319 Under Title VII and the Ellerth and Faragher
309 Id.
310 Malik, 202 F.3d at 101.
311 Id.
312 Id.
313 Id.
311 Id. at 101-02.
", Malik, 202 F.3d at 101-02.
316 Id. at 102.
317 Id. at 103.
8 Id. at 108.
319 Id. at 105.
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decisions, "an employer's investigation of a sexual harassment
complaint is not a gratuitous or optional undertaking.
" 1
21
Furthermore, even if the woman who complained wanted to
drop the investigation, the company's duty to investigate
remains: "Prudent employers will compel harassing employees
to cease all such conduct and will not, even at the victim's
request, tolerate inappropriate conduct that may, if not halted
immediately, create a hostile environment."32' Federal policies
cannot be undermined by damage actions under state law that
would reduce an employer's incentive "to take reasonable
corrective action" required by federal law.322 Under the jury
instructions on emotional distress given in this case, the court
found that
virtually any employer investigation into allegations of sexual
harassment would expose the employer to liability. Such
investigations foreseeably produce emotional distress--often in
copious amounts-in alleged harassers, whether guilty or innocent.
As with any investigation into potentially embarrassing personal
interactions, confidentiality is difficult or impossible to maintain if
all pertinent information is to be acquired from all possible
323
sources.
The court also commented on the difficulty employers
face when investigators encounter resistance from
complainants or lower-level supervisors, stemming from their
desire to resolve the matter informally to preserve workplace
harmony. Despite such resistance, management must "press
the investigation, . . . even at the risk of misunderstandings
that cause great emotional distress . ..because once higher
management has notice of the problem, it may later face civil
liability if it fails . . . to act to prevent recurrence or
expansion."24 The court held that Malik failed to state a claim
for negligent infliction of emotional distress as a matter of law;
the events he relied on would be common to any investigation
of sexual harassment required by federal law. In the court's
view, this case involved "ordinary, garden-variety personnel
actions.",2 5 The Second Circuit refused to speculate about what
310 Malik, 202 F.3d at 105.
321 Id. at 106.
322 Id.
323 Id.
324 Id.
321 Malik, 202 F.3d at 110.
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type of "egregious or outrageous acts" might legitimately
support such a state law claim. 26
Despite terminated employees' notable lack of success in
challenging the harassment charges leveled against them,
employers continue to worry about defamation actions or other
possible lawsuits disciplined or terminated harassers could file.
One wonders if such employer fears are simply a smokescreen
for an unwillingness to take charge of the workplace
environment and make it more hospitable for women
employees. Perhaps the Supreme Court's emphasis on prompt
corrective action will encourage employers to take more
aggressive action to eliminate sexual harassment.
C. Require Employers to Release Information to
Complainants and Co-workers About the Results of
Sexual Harassment Investigations
If employers want to convince employees that they have
effective sexual harassment prevention programs in place, they
must provide information to employees about actions taken in
resolving prior complaints. It is particularly important that
women who complain about sexual harassment be given the
results of the employer's investigation and told about any
discipline taken against the harasser. 27 Otherwise, employees
will have no basis for encouraging other women to complain.
Just as employers are not liable for the release of
information at work about employees terminated for
harassment, they will not be liable for informing employees
that another employee or a supervisor assigned to their work
area was found to have harassed in the past, but is being given
a chance to improve. The employer should assure a known
harasser's co-workers that it will carefully monitor his working
relationships, and if any further incidents arise, any employee
should immediately alert management. Retaining a person
found to have sexually harassed other employees should not be
treated any differently than retaining an employee found to
126 Id. at 108.
121 One attorney advises managers to communicate the results of the
investigation to the complainant and at that time, once again, assure her that no
retaliatory conduct will be tolerated. See Javier Van Oordt, Thorough Sexual
Harassment Investigation Can Limit Liability, L.A. DAILY J., July 29, 2002, at 7. He
also advises employers to follow up with complainants every few weeks for several
months to ensure that the problem has been resolved and no retaliation has occurred.
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have stolen tools from work. Extra precaution must be taken to
ensure the employee does not steal tools again. Similarly, extra
precaution must be taken to make sure the person does not
harass employees again.
Whether the harasser is terminated or remains at work,
women who were harassed deserve to know how the company
disciplined their harasser. If the company terminates him,
fellow employees will generally be aware of this disposition, as
departure is usually a public event. If the discipline falls short
of termination, however, then the employer must inform
employees who continue to work with the disciplined employee
of the action taken to resolve the victim's complaint. If victims
and other potential targets of harassment are not informed,
serious harassment could recur, an employer's liability will
increase, and women will have little basis for trusting the
employer's prevention policy. 28
Furthermore, if employers leave women in the dark
about the actions taken to resolve sexual harassment
complaints, women will be unable to evaluate accurately the
possibility of remaining in that place of employment without
further incidents of harassment. In one case, Montero v. AGCO
Corp.,"' the employer granted plaintiff Montero's request for
"" One victim of harassment by a repeat harasser attempted to convince a
federal court that her public employer should be held liable for negligence in not
preventing one incident of sexual harassment, because another woman had previously
filed a sexual harassment complaint against the same man. See Longstreet v. Illinois
Dept. of Corr., 276 F.3d 379 (7th Cir. 2002). The court found that the only prior
incident reported to the employer was a minor one and the offending employee had
been immediately reassigned to another job, so the first complaining woman did not
have to work with him again. Id. at 382. The only other option, in the court's view,
would have been for the employer to fire the harasser, and the first incident was too
minor to justify termination. Id. at 383. The court did not discuss any other possible
actions the employer could have taken, such as informing any women who would have
to work with the harasser in the future about the prior complaint. When the man
harassed the second woman in a much more serious way, he was terminated. The court
upheld the lower court's grant of the employer's summary judgment motion, finding
that this employer was not negligent, and therefore, not liable for the co-worker's
harassment. Id. at 381. In commenting on the need for employers to prevent
harassment from occurring, the court said:
We have recognized that deterrence is an objective in imposing liability on
employers for the creation of a hostile environment by a plaintiffs co-
workers. An employer's response to allegations of harassment "must be
reasonably calculated to prevent further harassment under the particular
facts and circumstances of the case at the time the allegations are made." . .
What is a reasonable response depends on the gravity of the harassment.
Id. at 382. A reasonable response from an employer could include informing other
employees who need to know, because they work with the harasser, about the
discipline imposed on the harasser for his earlier workplace misconduct.
329 192 F.3d 856 (9th Cir. 1999).
[Vol. 68: 2
PREVENTING SEXUAL HARASSMENT
paid administrative leave as soon as she told the employer
about the harassment. The employer then took swift action in
terminating the harassing supervisor and disciplining
Montero's two harassing co-workers.3 ° Montero was the only
woman among the eight employees working at the employer's
warehouse."3 ' When Montero called the employer one week
after she went out on leave, to find out if her harassing
supervisor still worked there, the employer refused to tell her
that he had been terminated, saying only that appropriate
disciplinary measures had been taken and all employees had
been warned that the company would not tolerate any
retaliation.332 Montero remained off work for four months, and
then resigned after several visits to a psychologist.33 Only
when Montero's attorney contacted the employer about her
resignation did Montero, through her attorney, learn that the
harassing supervisor was terminated during her first week on
leave.334 Obviously, Montero had not contacted any of her male
co-workers while she was on leave. Had Montero known that
the supervisor was terminated, she might have been willing to
come back to work weeks earlier, instead of attempting
unsuccessfully to find the courage to go back into what she
presumed would be a continuing hostile environment.
Montero eventually lost her lawsuit under the
affirmative defense. The Ninth Circuit affirmed a summary
judgment for the employer, agreeing with the court below that
the employer had taken prompt corrective action. 35 From the
time that Montero complained, it took the employer only eleven
days to investigate and take "decisive and meaningful" action
against the harassers.336 Montero lost under the second prong of
the employer's affirmative defense because she could not
produce any facts justifying her two-year delay in informing
the employer about the harassment. 37 Although the court
attached no significance to the employer's refusal to tell
Montero about its termination of the harassing supervisor at a
330 The harassing supervisor was fired eleven days after Montero first notified
the company of the harassment. Id. at 859.
331 Id. at 858.
332 Id. at 859-60.
3 Id. at 860.
334 Montero, 192 F.3d at 860.
33 Id. at 863.
336 Id.
337 Id.
20021
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
meaningful time, had the employer done so, Montero may have
been willing to come back to work instead of eventually
resigning and hiring a lawyer.
This fact pattern illustrates the importance of providing
harassed women as much information as possible about any
actions the employer has taken to eliminate harassment in the
workplace. If Carrie Montero's employer had given her the
information she needed, that her supervisor had been
terminated and the other two employees disciplined, instead of
hiding behind a claim of confidentiality, Montero might have
come back to work immediately. Instead, Montero was left in
the dark, spent four months in counseling while on leave and
then decided to quit instead of coming back to work. Adequate
and timely information likely would have eliminated the
lawsuit altogether.
Information is vital to employees in deciding how to
handle such a difficult situation as workplace harassment. In
Montero, an employee would have gone back to work and the
employer would have demonstrated to its own employees that
it took sexual harassment seriously and that its prevention
policies were effective. The employer's release of information
about disciplinary actions taken was particularly important in
Montero because Montero was the only woman working in the
warehouse. She had no women colleagues to confide in and no
women colleagues to call her at home and tell her what had
happened. Her only source of information was the company. If
employers learned how to use information about the resolution
of sexual harassment complaints constructively, employers
themselves would benefit from increased productivity,
significantly less turnover of employees and fewer expensive
lawsuits. By using information to create a better work
environment for women, all would benefit.
CONCLUSION
The moral of this story is that women must be brave.
The federal courts are not going to protect women who are
afraid. Somehow, women must overcome all the traditional
reasons that keep many quiet and afraid to speak up at work.
Public education is necessary to tell women about the federal
courts' new legal requirement that women must complain
before filing suit. At a minimum, plaintiffs' attorneys must
educate women clients about the need to tell the employer
about the harassment before filing suit, unless there is specific
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factual information about the employer's failure to stop prior
known harassment. An attorney can assist a woman in
communicating with her employer about sexual harassment
and can help protect her while she remains on the job. If the
woman has already left her job because of the harassment,
however, she may no longer have a viable federal claim. If the
employer did not know of the harassment, or if the employer
learned about the harassment and took swift and meaningful
action to end it, then any chance of winning a federal lawsuit is
slim.
To assist women in finding the courage to complain,
federal courts must re-examine the hostile environment
affirmative defense and require employers to take significant
action to demonstrate to women employees that sexual
harassment prevention policies are effective. Release of
information about the resolution of past complaints is key.
Only with accurate information can women realistically assess
the likelihood that complaining about harassment will make it
stop. Employers must cease covering up the problems of
harassment at work. They must bring the issue out into the
open.
Eventually, plaintiffs' lawyers will learn to develop the
fact patterns necessary to defeat the affirmative defense.
Through discovery, attorneys should be able to obtain
information about the employer's resolution of past complaints
in litigating the issue of reasonable care under prong one of the
affirmative defense. In addition, women at work need to collect
such information from each other in preparation for filing a
complaint at work or later filing suit.
The Supreme Court's affirmative defense to hostile
environment sexual harassment has the potential to create
meaningful dispute resolution procedures at work. If women
discover the possibilities inherent in the affirmative defense,
they will be able to assist themselves and each other in
eliminating sexual harassment in their working environments.
If women remain afraid and reluctant to complain, employers
will continue to escape their obligation to provide a place to
work where both women and men enjoy an equal opportunity
to succeed.
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